Mahinder Singh and Others v. State of Punjab and Others

ANOOP CHITKARA, J. DDR Dated Police Sta.on Sec.ons No. 045 30.04.2022 Sadar Ferozepur, Disti. 324, 323, 506, 148, 149 IPC and Ferozepur Sec!on 326 IPC added later on IN FIR Dated Police Sta.on Sec.ons No. 0093 30.04.2022 Sadar Ferozepur, Disti. 323, 506, 148, 149 IPC Ferozepur The pe!!oners, arraigned as accused in the above cap!oned DDR, have come up before this Court under Sec!on 482 CrPC for quashing of the DDR and all consequen!al proceedings based on the compromise with the aggrieved persons.

¶2During the pendency of the criminal proceedings, the accused and the aggrieved persons have compromised the matier, and its copy is annexed with this pe!!on as Annexure P-3.

¶3A<er that, the pe!!oners came up before this Court to quash the DDR, impleading the aggrieved persons as respondents no.2 to 4.

¶4Pursuant to order of this Court dated 05.07.2024, the aggrieved persons (R-2 to R-4), appeared before the Addl. Chief Judicial Magistrate, Ferozepur and stated that there would be no objec!on if the Court quashes this DDR and consequent proceedings. As per the concerned court's report dated 19.09.2024, the par!es order/judgment. 1

consented to the quashing of DDR and consequent proceedings without any threat or coercion. ANALYSIS & REASONING:

¶5Despite the severe opposi!on of the State's counsel to this compromise, the following aspects would be relevant to conclude this pe!!on: - a) The accused and the private respondent have amicably setiled the matier between them in terms of the compromise deed and the statements recorded before the concerned Court; b) A perusal of the documents reveal that the setilement has not been secured through coercion, threats, social boycotis, bribes, or other dubious means; c) The aggrieved person has willingly consented to the nullifica!on of criminal proceedings; d) There is no objec!on from the private respondent in case present FIR and consequent proceedings are quashed; e) In the given facts, the occurrence does not affect public peace or tranquillity, moral turpitude or harm the social and moral fabric of the society or involve matiers concerning public policy; f) The rejec!on of compromise may also lead to ill will. The pendency of trial affects career and happiness; g) There is nothing on the record to prima facie consider the accused as an unscrupulous, incorrigible, or professional offender; h) The purpose of criminal jurisprudence is reformatory in nature and to work to bring peace to family, community, and society;

i) The exercise of the inherent power for quashing FIR and all consequen!al proceedings is jus!fied to secure the ends of jus!ce.

¶6In the present case, the offences under sec!ons 324, 326, 148, 149 of the Indian Penal Code, 1860 are not compoundable under Sec!on 320 of Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (CrPC). However, in the facts and circumstances peculiar to this case, the prosecu!on qua the non-compoundable offences can be closed by quashing the DDR and consequent proceedings.

¶7The injured and all the accused had appeared before the Court of ACJM and had stated that they had entered into a compromise. The par!es belong to the same village or nearby villages and must be living there for genera!ons and might con!nue to live, but who knows for how long. In the closely-knit village community, when the par!es JYOTI have buried their hatchets, the con!nua!on of criminal proceedings will not advance order/judgment. 2

the reforma!ve purposes of jurisprudence just for the sake of deterrence. Even otherwise, cross cases have been registered by both the par!es against each other and now, they have effected compromise and seek quashing of DDR based on compromise.

¶8In Y. Suresh Babu v State of A.P., (2005) 1 SCC 347, Hon'ble Supreme Court, while dealing with sec!on 326 of IPC, which was non-compoundable offence, permitied the par!es to compound the offence.

¶9In Yogendra Yadav v State of Jharkhand, 2014:INSC:496 [Para 4], 21.7.2014, Supreme Court holds, [4]. Now, the ques!on before this Court is whether this Court can compound the offences under Sec!ons 326 and 307 of the IPC which are non-compoundable. Needless to say that offences which are non-compoundable cannot be compounded by the court. Courts draw the power of compounding offences from Sec!on 320 of the Code. The said provision has to be strictly followed (Gian Singh v. State of Punjab, 2012(4) R.C.R.(Criminal) 543 : 2012(4) Recent Apex Judgments (R.A.J.) 549 : (2012)10 SCC 303). However, in a given case, the High Court can quash a criminal proceeding in exercise of its power under sec!on 482 of the Code having regard to the fact that the par!es have amicably setiled their disputes and the vic!m has no objec!on, even though the offences are non-compoundable. In which cases the High Court can exercise its discre!on to quash the proceedings will depend on facts and circumstances of each case. Offences which involve moral turpitude, grave offences like rape, murder etc. cannot be effaced by quashing the proceedings because that will have harmful effect on the society. Such offences cannot be said to be restricted to two individuals or two groups. If such offences are quashed, it may send wrong signal to the society. However, when the High Court is convinced that the offences are en!rely personal in nature and, therefore, do not affect public peace or tranquillity and where it feels that quashing of such proceedings on account of compromise would bring about peace and would secure ends of jus!ce, it should not hesitate to quash them. In such cases, the prosecu!on becomes a lame prosecu!on. Pursuing such a lame prosecu!on would be waste of !me and energy. That will also unsetile the compromise and obstruct restora!on of peace.

¶10In Shiji @ Pappu v. Radhika, (2011) 10 SCC 705, Hon'ble Supreme Court holds, [13]. It is manifest that simply because an offence is not compoundable under Sec!on 320 Indian Penal Code is by itself no reason for the High Court to refuse exercise of its power under Sec!on 482 Criminal Procedure Code That power can in our opinion be exercised in cases where there is no chance of recording a convic!on against the accused and the en!re exercise of a trial is des!ned to be an exercise in fu!lity. There JYOTI is a subtle dis!nc!on between compounding of offences by order/judgment. 3 the par es before the trial Court or in appeal on one hand and the exercise of power by the High Court to quash the prosecu on under Sec on 482 Criminal Procedure Code on the other. While a Court trying an accused or hearing an appeal against convic on, may not be competent to permit compounding of an offence based on a setilement arrived at between the par es in cases where the offences are not compoundable under Sec on 320, the High Court may quash the prosecu on even in cases where the offences with which the accused stand charged are non-compoundable. The inherent powers of the High Court under Sec on 482 Criminal Procedure Code are not for that purpose controlled by Sec on 320 Criminal Procedure Code Having said so, we must hasten to add that the plenitude of the power under Sec on 482 Criminal Procedure Code by itself, makes it obligatory for the High Court to exercise the same with utmost care and cau on. The width and the nature of the power itself demands that its exercise is sparing and only in cases where the High Court is, for reasons to be recorded, of the clear view that con nuance of the prosecu on would be nothing but an abuse of the process of law. It is neither necessary nor proper for us to enumerate the situa ons in which the exercise of power under Sec on 482 may be jus fied. All that we need to say is that the exercise of power must be for securing the ends of jus ce and only in cases where refusal to exercise that power may result in the abuse of the process of law. The High court may be jus fied in declining interference if it is called upon to appreciate evidence for it cannot assume the role of an appellate court while dealing with a pe

on under Sec on 482 of the Criminal Procedure Code. Subject to the above, the High Court will have to consider the facts and circumstances of each case to determine whether it is a fit case in which the inherent powers may be invoked.

¶11In Parbatbhai Aahir v State of Gujarat, 2017:INSC:1003 [Para 15], (2017) 9 SCC 641, a three Judges Bench of Hon'ble Supreme Court, laid down the broad principles for quashing of FIR, which are reproduced as follows: - [16]. The broad principles which emerge from the precedents on the subject, may be summarized in the following proposi ons: 16 (i) Sec on 482 preserves the inherent powers of the High Court to prevent an abuse of the process of any court or to secure the ends of jus ce. The provision does not confer new powers. It only recognises and preserves powers which inhere in the High Court; 16 (ii) The invoca on of the jurisdic on of the High Court to quash a First Informa on Report or a criminal proceeding on the ground that a setilement has been arrived at between the offender and the vic m is not the same as the invoca on of jurisdic on for the purpose of compounding an offence. While compounding an offence, the power of the court is governed by the provisions of sec on 320 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973. The power to quash under Sec on 482 is atiracted even if the offence is non-compoundable. 16 (iii) In forming an opinion whether a criminal proceeding or complaint should be quashed in exercise of its jurisdic on under Sec on 482, the High Court must evaluate whether the ends of jus ce would jus fy the exercise of the inherent power; 16 (iv) While the inherent power of the High Court has a wide ambit and plenitude it has to be exercised; (i) to secure the ends of jus ce or (ii) to prevent an abuse of the process of any court; 16 (v) The decision as to whether a complaint or First Informa on Report should be quashed on the ground that the offender and vic m have setiled the dispute, revolves ul mately on the facts and circumstances of each case and no exhaus ve elabora on of principles can be formulated; 16 (vi) In the exercise of the power under Sec on 482 and while dealing with a plea that the dispute has been setiled, the High Court must have due regard to the nature and gravity of the offence. Heinous and serious offences involving mental depravity or offences such as murder, rape and dacoity cannot appropriately be quashed though the vic m or the family of the vic m have setiled the dispute. Such offences are, truly speaking, not private in nature but have a serious impact upon society. The decision to con nue with the trial in such cases is founded on the overriding element of public interest in punishing persons for serious offences; 16 (vii) As dis nguished from serious offences, there may be criminal cases which have an overwhelming or predominant element of a civil dispute. They stand on a dis nct foo ng in so far as the exercise of the inherent power to quash is concerned; 16 (viii) Criminal cases involving offences which arise from commercial, financial, mercan le, partnership or similar transac ons with an essen ally civil flavour may in appropriate situa ons fall for quashing where par es have setiled the dispute; 16 (ix) In such a case, the High Court may quash the criminal proceeding if in view of the compromise between the disputants, the possibility of a convic on is remote and the con nua on of a criminal proceeding would cause oppression and prejudice; and 16 (x) There is yet an excep on to the principle set out in proposi ons (viii) and (ix) above. Economic offences involving the financial and economic well-being of the state have implica ons which lie beyond the domain of a mere dispute between private disputants. The High Court would be jus fied in declining to quash where the offender is involved in an ac vity akin to a financial or economic fraud or misdemeanour. The consequences of the act complained of upon the financial or economic system will weigh in the balance.

¶12In Ramgopal v. The State of Madhya Pradesh, Cr.A 1489 of 2012, decided on

29.09.2021, Hon'ble Supreme Court holds, [11]. True it is that offences which are 'non-compoundable' cannot be compounded by a criminal court in purported exercise of its powers under Sec on 320 Cr.P.C. Any such atiempt by the court would amount to altera on, addi on and modifica on of Sec on 320 Cr.P.C, which is the exclusive domain of Legislature. There is no patent or latent ambiguity in the language of Sec on 320 Cr.P.C., which may jus fy its wider interpreta on and include such offences in the docket of 'compoundable' offences which have been consciously kept out as non-compoundable. Nevertheless, the limited jurisdic on to compound an offence within the framework of Sec on 320 Cr.P.C. is not an embargo against invoking inherent powers by the High Court vested in it under Sec on 482 Cr.P.C. The High Court, keeping in view the peculiar facts and circumstances of a case and for jus fiable reasons can press Sec on 482 Cr.P.C. in aid to prevent abuse of the process of any Court and/or to secure the ends of jus ce. [12]. The High Court, therefore, having regard to the nature of the offence and the fact that par es have amicably setiled their dispute and the vic m has willingly consented to the nullifica on of criminal proceedings, can quash such proceedings in exercise of its inherent powers under Sec on 482 Cr.P.C., even if the offences are non-compoundable. The High Court can indubitably evaluate the consequen al effects of the offence beyond the body of an individual and therea<er adopt a pragma c approach, to ensure that the felony, even if goes unpunished, does not nker with or paralyze the very object of the administra on of criminal jus ce system. [13]. It appears to us those criminal proceedings involving non-heinous offences or where the offences are predominantly of a private nature, can be annulled irrespec ve of the fact that trial has already been concluded or appeal stands dismissed against convic on. Handing out punishment is not the sole form of delivering jus ce. Societal method of applying laws evenly is always subject to lawful excep ons. It goes without saying, that the cases where compromise is struck postconvic on, the High Court ought to exercise such discre on with rec tude, keeping in view the circumstances surrounding the incident, the fashion in which the compromise has been arrived at, and with due regard to the nature and seriousness of the offence, besides the conduct of the accused, before and a<er the incidence. The touchstone for exercising the extraordinary power under Sec on 482 Cr.P.C. would be to secure the ends of jus ce. There can be no hard and fast line constric ng the power of the High Court to do substan al jus ce. A restric ve construc on of inherent powers under Sec on 482 Cr.P.C. may lead to rigid or specious jus ce, which in the given facts and circumstances of a case, may rather lead to grave injus ce. On the other hand, in cases where heinous offences have been proved against perpetrators, no such benefit ought to be extended, as cau ously observed by this Court in Narinder Singh &Ors. vs. State of Punjab &Ors. [(2014) 6 SCC 466, 29], and Laxmi Narayan [(2019) 5 SCC 688, 15]. [14]. In other words, grave or serious offences or offences which involve moral turpitude or have a harmful effect on the social and moral fabric of the society or involve matiers concerning public policy, cannot be construed between two individuals or groups only, for such offences have the poten al to impact the society at large. Effacing abominable offences through quashing process would not only send a wrong signal to the community but may also accord an undue benefit to unscrupulous habitual or professional offenders, who can secure a 'setilement' through duress, threats, social boycotis, bribes or other dubious means. It is well said that "let no guilty man escape, if it can be avoided."

¶13In Shakuntala Sawhney v Kaushalya Sawhney, (1979) 3 SCR 639, at P 642, Hon'ble Supreme Court observed that the finest hour of Jus ce arises propi ously when par es, who fell apart, bury the hatchet and weave a sense of fellowship or reunion.

¶14In the light of the judicial precedents referred to above, given the terms of compromise, placement of par es, and other factors peculiar to the case, the contents of the compromise deed and its objec ves point towards its acceptance.

¶15In Himachal Pradesh Cricket Associa on v State of Himachal Pradesh, 2018:INSC:1039 [Para 47], 2018 (4) Crimes 324, Hon'ble Supreme Court holds "[47]. As far as Writ Pe

on (Criminal) No. 135 of 2017 is concerned, the appellants came to this Court challenging the order of cognizance only because of the reason that matier was already pending as the appellants had filed the Special Leave Pe

ons against the order of the High Court rejec ng their pe

on for quashing of the FIR/Chargesheet. Having regard to these peculiar facts, writ pe

on has also been entertained. In any case, once we hold that FIR needs to be quashed, order of cognizance would automa cally stands vi ated."

¶16Considering the en re facts, compromise, and in the light of the above-men oned judicial precedents, I believe that con nuing these proceedings will not suffice any fruiVul purpose whatsoever.

¶17In the facts and circumstances peculiar to this case, the Court invokes the inherent jurisdic on under sec on 482 CrPC and quashes the DDR and all subsequent proceedings qua the pe

oners. The bail bonds of the pe

oners are accordingly discharged. Pe..on allowed in the terms men.oned above. All pending applica on(s), if any, stand closed. (ANOOP CHITKARA) JUDGE December 12, 2024 Jyo -II : :

IN THE HIGH COURT OF PUNJAB AND HARYANA AT CHANDIGARH CRM-M-31468-2024 (O&M) Reserved on: 03.12.2024 Date of Pronouncement: 12.12.2024 Mahinder Singh and others ... Pe!!oners Versus State of Punjab and others …Respondents CORAM: HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE ANOOP CHITKARA Present:- Mr. B.S. Sidhu, Advocate for the pe!!oners. Mr. Akshay Kumar, AAG, Punjab. Mr. Gurmeet Singh Saini, Advocate for respondents no.2 to 4. ***