Rohit Verma v. State of Punjab and Others

HARPREET SINGH BRAR, J. (ORAL)

¶1The present petition has been preferred under Section 482, Cr.P.C. seeking setting aside of the impugned order (Annexure P-3) dated 12.10.2022, passed by the learned Additional Principal Judge, Family Court, Ludhiana whereby conditional warrants of arrest were issued against the petitioner as well as all subsequent proceedings arising out of the same.

¶2The marriage between the petitioner and respondent No.2 was solemnized in accordance with Hindu rites and ceremonies. Three children were born out of the wedlock i.e. respondent No.3 to 5. Soon thereafter, matrimonial dispute ensued between the couple and respondent No.2 filed a petition under Section 125 Cr.P.C. seeking maintenance for herself and their minor children. During the said proceedings, respondent No.2 filed an application seeking interim   maintenance   which   was   allowed   vide   order   dated   19.04.2019. Resultantly, the petitioner was directed to pay  Rs. 75,000/- per month to the wife and their kids as interim maintenance from the date of the filing of the application. Subsequently, upon non-payment of the maintenance amount, respondent No.2 to 5 preferred an execution application for the recovery of the amount of arrears. In the execution proceedings, the petitioner was proceededAJAY GOSWAMI CRM-M-33308-2024 2 against ex-parte due to his non-appearance. Respondent No. 2 to 5 supplied a list of properties owned by the petitioner  and correspondingly, warrants of attachment of the said properties were issued vide order dated 16.12 .2021, which was followed by the issuance of conditional warrants of arrest vide impugned order dated 12.10.2022.

¶3Learned counsel for the petitioner contends that the impugned order dated 12.10.2022 is liable to be set aside since the property of the petitioner has already been attached by the learned Court below. The recovery of maintenance amount has already been initiated by attaching the property of the petitioner therefore the issuance of conditional warrants of arrest is illegal and arbitrary. Furthermore, respondent No. 2 to 5 were given possession of the property against which the warrants of attachment were issued and the value of the said property is much higher than the maintenance amount owed. Learned counsel further argues that the non-appearance of the petitioner in the execution proceedings was unintentional as he was already embroiled in several income tax cases and had only faltered in payment of the arrears of maintenance because he was  under heavy financial burden. The petitioner is ready and willing to join the proceedings and has already filed an application for setting aside the ex parte order which is pending consideration before the learned Court below. Lastly, learned counsel submits that the petitioner is unable to appear in another criminal case due to the order of the conditional warrants of arrest, and prays for the same to be set aside.

¶4I have heard learned counsel for the petitioner and carefully perused the record with his able assistance. However, for proper adjudication of the case at hand, it is pertinent to advert to Section 125 Cr.P.C., which deals AJAY GOSWAMI with providing maintenance to wife, children and parents. CRM-M-33308-2024 3

¶5The object and purpose behind granting maintenance is to ensure that the dependent spouse is not reduced to destitution or vagrancy on account of failure of marriage. At the same time, a just and careful balance must be struck to ensure that this provision does not degenerate into a weapon to punish the   other   spouse.   The   Courts   are   required   to   conduct   the   maintenance proceedings while being alive to the legislative intent behind the provision under Section 125 Cr.P.C in its true spirit, which is to provide speedy assistance and social justice to women, children and infirm parents. The provisions of Section 125 Cr.P.C. were enacted as a measure to further social justice and protect dependent women, children and parents, which also fall within the constitutional   sweep   of   Article   15(3)   reinforced   by   Article   39   of   the Constitution of India.

¶6A three-Judge Bench of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in Vimala (K.) v. Veeraswamy (K.) (1991) 2 SCC 375, speaking through Justice Fatima Beevi, opined that as follows: "3. Section 125 of the Code of Criminal Procedure is meant to achieve a social purpose. The object is to prevent vagrancy and destitution. It provides a speedy remedy for the supply of food, clothing, and shelter to the deserted wife." A two-Judge Bench of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in Kirtikant D. Vadodaria v. State of Gujarat (1996) 4 SCC 479, speaking through Justice Faizan Uddin, opined as follows: "15. ...While dealing with the ambit and scope of the provision contained in Section 125 of the Code, it has to be borne in mind that the dominant and primary object is to give social justice to the woman, child and infirm parents, etc. and to prevent destitution and vagrancy by compelling those who can support those who are unable to support themselves but have a moral claim for support. The provisions in Section 125 provide a speedy remedy to those women, children and destitute parents who are in distress. The provisions in Section 125 are intended to achieve this special purpose. The dominant purpose behind the benevolent provisions contained in Section 125 clearly is  that the wife, child and parents should not be left in a helpless state of distress, destitution and starvation."

¶7There is a general tendency on the part of the wife to amplify her CRM-M-33308-2024 4 needs and the husband to conceal his actual income, making it difficult to determine the earning capacity of the rival claimants with exactitude. The rival claimants must scrupulously bring on record their actual respective earning capacities in order for the Court to arrive at quantum of maintenance which is just and fair in terms of principle of equistatus. The quantum of maintenance must be justifiable and realistic to provide succour to the dependent spouse and also to avoid occurrence of the two extremes of the maintenance being either paltry or extravagant, ensuring that neither of the two is reduced to a life of penury. The adequacy of the maintenance allowance has to be determined by the yardstick of the dependent spouse being able to lead a life of reasonable comfort.

¶8However, for proper adjudication of the present case, it is pertinent to refer to the relevant provisions under Section 125, Cr.P.C., which is extracted below: Section 125. Order for maintenance of wives, children and parents.

(3) If any person so ordered fails without sufficient cause to comply with the order, any such Magistrate may, for every breach of the order, issue a warrant for levying the amount due in the manner provided for levying fines, and may sentence such person, for the whole or any part of each months   allowance   for   the   maintenance   or   the   interim maintenance and expenses of proceeding, as the case may be, remaining unpaid after the execution of the warrant, to imprisonment for a term which may extend to one month or until payment if sooner made.

¶9The distinction between the mode of enforcing recovery and effecting actual recovery of the amount of maintenance which has fallen in arrears in the context of the provisions under Section 125(3) of Cr.P.C. was discussed in the case of Smt. Kuldip Kaur vs. Surinder Singh and anr. (1989) I attest to the accuracy and1 SCC 405, wherein a 2 Judge bench of the Hon'ble Supreme Court, speaking CRM-M-33308-2024 5 through Justice M.P. Thakkar, made the following observations: "6.  A distinction has to be drawn between a mode of enforcing recovery on the one hand and effecting actual recovery of the amount of monthly allowance which has fallen in arrears on the other. Sentencing a person to jail is a 'mode of enforcement'. It is not a 'mode of satisfaction' of the liability. The liability can be satisfied only by making actual payment of the arrears. The whole purpose of sending to jail is to oblige a person liable to pay the monthly allowance who refuses to comply with the order without sufficient cause, to obey the order and to make the payment. The purpose of sending him to jail is not to wipe out the liability which he has refused to discharge Be it also realised that a person ordered to pay monthly allowance can be sent to jail only if he fails to pay monthly allowance 'without sufficient cause' to comply with the order. It would indeed be strange to hold that a person who 'without reasonable cause' refuses to comply with the order of the Court to maintain his neglected wife or child would be absolved of his liability merely because he prefers to go to jail sentence of jail is no substitute for the recovery of the amount of monthly allowance which has fallen in arrears Monthly allowance is paid in order to enable the wife and child to live by providing with the essential economic wherewithal. Neither the neglected  wife  nor  the neglected  child  can  live  without   funds   for purchasing food and the essential articles to enable them to live. Instead of providing them with the funds, no useful purpose would be served by sending the husband to jail Sentencing to jail is the means for achieving the end of enforcing the order by recovering the amount of arrears. It is not a mode of discharging liability. The section does not say so. The Parliament in its wisdom has not said so commence does not support such a construction. From where does the Court draw inspiration for persuading   itself   that   the   liability   arising   under   the   order   for maintenance would stand discharged upon an effort being made to recover it ? The order for monthly allowance can be discharged only upon the monthly allowance being recovered. The liability cannot be taken to have been by sending the person liable to pay the monthly allowance, to jail. At the cost of repetition it may be stated that it is only a mode or method of recovery and not a substitute for recovery. No other view is possible." (emphasis added)

¶10A close scrutiny of Section 125(3) Cr.P.C. reveals that in case of breach of the order directing payment of maintenance, the Magistrate may issue warrant for levying the amount due in the manner provided for levying fines as prescribed under Section 421 of Cr.P.C. and the Magistrate may also sentence such person for the whole or any part of each month allowance. Both of these are methods to impel the person against whom execution proceedings have been initiated to pay the maintenance amount which has fallen in arrears. However,AJAY GOSWAMI CRM-M-33308-2024 6 the e%plo1%ent of these %odes of enforcin& recover1 is not to be confused with the actual realisation of the %aintenance a%ount due or as a satisfactor1 substitute for the latter. !he a%bit and scope of the powers as devolved b1 Section  $,:+; Cr.P.C., are not to penali(e or punish the trans&ressin& part1, who hasn>t co%plied with the order, but rather, to drive hi% to a situation where he is put under an obli&ation to pa1 the %onthl1 allowance and %a*es the actual pa1%ent of arrears. !he intent of the le&islature in this re&ard is further %ade e6plicit b1 the provision which allows for sentencin& the person, who fails without sufficient cause to co%pl1 with the order without sufficeint cause, for the whole or an1 part of each %onth>s allowance for the %aintenance, includin& interi%   %aintenance   re%ainin&   unpaid.   !he   sentence   %a1   e6tend   to i%prison%ent for a ter% up to one %onth or until pa1%ent is %ade, if sooner. !he provisions under Chapter I@ of Cr.P.C. are in the nature of a beneficent le&islation. !he purpose and object is to provide a si%ple and speed1 re%ed1, and to ensure that the deserted wife, children and parents are not left without an1 %eans for subsistence. . At this juncture, it would be profitable to cite the jud&%ent delivered b1 a -ivision =ench of the 0ajasthan )i&h Court in .n 1e 2 1ef. 3nder Se%tion 395 Cr.4.C.' 1973 5y Distri%t and Sessions 6!d*e' 4ali vs. 3nknown   2,22   (1)   1.C.1.   (Criminal)   $35'  wherein   the   followin&   was observed: "7. Firstly, we consider the plain language of Section 125(3) Cr.P.C., 1973 which provides that "if a person ordered to pay maintenance, fails without sufficient cause to comply with the order, the Magistrate may, for every breach of the order, issue a warrant for levying the amount due in the manner provided for levying fines and may sentence such person for the whole or any part of each month's allowance for the maintenance....., to imprisonment for a term which may extend to one month or until payment if sooner made." Splitting the provision for better understanding, AJAY GOSWAMI it becomes clear that it operates in four parts: CRM-M-33308-2024 7

(i) Non-compliance of the order of maintenance by the person directed to pay monthly maintenance,

(ii) Every breach of the order,

(iii) Issuance of warrant for levying the amount due in the manner provided for levying fines and

(iv) Sentencing such person for the whole or any part of each month's allowance, imprisonment for a term which may extend to one month. Meaning thereby, if the person ordered to make payment of maintenance fails to do so, the Magistrate shall be empowered to issue warrant for recovery of the maintenance due in the manner provided for levying fines and may also sentence such person for the whole or any part of each month's allowance to imprisonment for a term which may extend to one month. Clearly thus, every single breach of the monthly maintenance order gives rise to a distinct cause of action calling for issuance of a warrant for levying of the amount and a discretion is given to the Magistrate that in the event of non-payment, the person ordered may be sentenced to imprisonment for a term which may extend to one month for each month's default. The clear intention of the legislature is that as the order of maintenance is stipulated to provide maintenance on a monthly basis, every breach thereof is an infringement for which a separate warrant for levying fine is to be issued and in addition thereto, the person so ordered can be sentenced to imprisonment for a term which may extend to one month concurring with every breach. The application for recovery of the maintenance amount can be filed within a period of 12 months from the date it becomes due. The section does not provide that the claimant must file separate applications for recovery of each month's allowance." (emphasis added)

¶2A perusal of the impugned order passed by the learned Family Court makes it evident that despite attachment of the property of the petitioner, he has failed to appear before the Court and make the actual payment of arrears. It is further observed by the learned Family Court that the petitioner cannot feign ignorance in the present case as he has challenged the order vide which interim maintenance was granted to respondents No.2 to 5. As a result, the conditional warrants of arrest were issued against the petitioner. The cardinal rule of interpretation of statutes is to read the statute literally and give the words their grammatical and natural meaning. If that is contrary to, or inconsistent with, any express intention or declared purpose of the statute, or if it would attract any absurdity, repugnancy or inconsistency, the grammatical sense must CRM-M-33308-2024 8 then be modified, extended or abridged, so far as to avoid such an inconvenience, but no further (See: Craies on Statute Law, Seventh ed. Page 83-85).

¶13A perusal of subsection (3) of Section 125, Cr.P.C. discloses that the Magistrate is empowered to issue warrant for recovery of the maintenance due in the manner provided for levying fines and may also sentence such person for the whole or any part of each month's allowance to imprisonment. The word "and" has to be given its plain and literal meaning and as such, has to be interpreted as a conjunctive term. Since the overarching intent of Chapter IX of Cr.P.C. is to maintain the neglected spouse and minor children and provide them with sufficient monthly allowance to enable them to lead a life of dignity, giving the word "and" its literal meaning would only better achieve the objective of recovering the amount of arrears and facilitate the payment of maintenance. Consequently, the averment of the learned counsel for the petitioner that issuance of conditional warrants of arrest is unwarranted after the property of the petitioner has already been attached, does not %erit acceptance. ".  Accordin&l1, the present petition is dis%issed bein& bereft of an1 %erits. ,. Pendin&   %iscellaneous   application:s;   if   an1,   shall   also   stand disposed of. 4HARPREET -INGH BRAR5 17'07'2024       JUDGE +ja  2os#ami %hether spea,ing3reasoned 4es3/o %hether reportable 4es3/o

CRM-M-33308-2024 1 117 IN THE HIGH COURT OF PUNJAB AND HARYANA AT CHANDIGARH CRM-M-33308-2024 Date of decision: 17.07.2024 Rohit Verma ...Petitioner Versus State of Punjab and others ...Respondents CORAM: HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE HARPREET SINGH BRAR Present: Mr. I.S. Chawla, Advocate for for the petitioner Mr. Subhash Godara, Addl. A.G., Punjab ****