Gurjant Singh v. State of Punjab and Ors

IN THE HIGH COURT OF PUNJAB & HARYANA AT CHANDIGARH

113              CWP-28733-2024 Date  ! "e#$%$ &' 08(11(2024

GURJANT )INGH            *(PETITIONER +%( )TATE OF PUNJAB AND OR)        (((RE)PONDENT)

CORA,' HON-B.E ,R( JU)TICE JAG,OHAN BAN)A.

Present:   Mr. Satvir Singh, Advocate for the petitioner.

Mr. Aman Dhir, DAG, Punjab.

****

JAG,OHAN BAN)A./ J 0ORA.1

¶1  he  petitioner  through  instant  petition  under Artic!e  ""#  of  the $onstitution  of  %ndia  is  see&ing setting aside of orders dated 28.07.2011 (Annexure P-2), 21.09.2013 (Annexure P-4), 07.10.2014 (Annexure P-6),

28.11.2018 (Annexure P-9) and 21.10.2019 (Annexure P-11) whereby he has been subjected to punishment of forfeiture of 4 increments. ". The petitioner was subjected to punishment of forfeiture of 7 years increments vide order dated 28.07.2011. He preferred an appeal which came to be dismissed vide order dated 21.09.2013. He preferred revision which was also dismissed vide order dated 07.10.2014. The petitioner was awarded punishment on account of registration of FIR No. 69 dated 12.04.2011 against him under Section 223 and 224 IPC. The Trial Court vide judgment dated 27.05.2015 found him guilty and awarded sentence of simple imprisonment of 2 months along with fine of Rs. 1,000/-.

'. The petitioner preferred an appeal before Additional Sessions Judge, Sangrur assailing judgment of conviction and order of punishment. Learned Additional Sessions Judge, Sangrur vide judgment dated 12.07.2017 set-aside judgment of conviction on the ground that sanction granted by SSP, Sangrur was defective. (. The petitioner preferred mercy petition before the Government. Additional Chief Secretary vide order dated 21.09.2019 reduced the quantum of departmental punishment from 7 years' forfeiture of increments to 4 years forfeiture of increments. ). The petitioner has preferred instant petition seeking setting-aside of orders passed by the police authorities and modification of order passed by Additional Chief Secretary whereby he has reduced the quantum of punishment. The impugned order was passed on 21.09.2019 and since then period of 5 years has elapsed. #. On being asked, Mr. Satvir Singh, Advocate submits that petitioner could not approach this Court on account of Covid-19 and his involvement in another criminal case. The petitioner has served legal notice upon respondents seeking setting-aside of departmental proceedings. *. He has placed on record orders passed by trial Court as well this Court disclosing that the petitioner was involved in another case and proceedings against him were set-aside by this Court. The petitioner was not dismissed from service and he diligently followed proceedings before Courts with respect to criminal case registered against him. +.   No hard-and-fast rule can be laid down as to when the High Court should refuse to exercise its jurisdiction in favour of a party who moves it after considerable delay and is otherwise guilty of laches. Discretion must be

exercised judiciously and reasonably. In the event that the claim made by the applicant is legally sustainable, delay should be condoned. Where illegality is manifest, it cannot be sustained on the sole ground of laches. When substantial justice and technical considerations are pitted against each other, the cause of substantial justice deserves to be preferred. State cannot deprive vested right because of a non- deliberate delay. In Eastern Coalfields Ltd. v. Dugal Kumar (2008) 14 SCC 295, supreme court has considered scope of interference in case of delay and laches. Court has held: "24. As to delay  and  laches  on the part  of the  writ petitioner,  there  is  substance  in  the  argument  of learned counsel for the appellant Company. It is well settled that under Article 226 of the Constitution, the power of a High Court to issue an appropriate writ, order or direction is discretionary. One of the grounds to refuse relief by a writ court is that the petitioner is guilty of delay and laches. It is imperative, where the petitioner invokes extraordinary remedy under Article 226  of  the  Constitution,  that  he  should  come  to  the court at the earliest reasonably possible opportunity. Inordinate  delay  in  making  the  motion  for  a  writ  is indeed  an  adequate  ground  for  refusing  to  exercise discretion in favour of the applicant." In Tilokchand Motichand v. H.B. Munshi (1969) 1 SCC 110 and Rabindranath Bose v. Union of India (1970) 1 SCC 84, Supreme Court has ruled that even in cases of violation or infringement of fundamental rights, a writ court may take into account delay and laches on the part of the petitioner in approaching the court and if there is gross or unexplained delay, the court may refuse to grant relief in favour of such petitioner.

In Chennai Metropolitan Water Supply & Sewerage Board V. T.T. Murali Babu (2014) 4 SCC 108, Supreme Court has ruled: '16. Thus, the doctrine of delay and laches should not be lightly brushed aside. A  writ  court is  required to weigh the explanation offered and the acceptability of the  same.  The  court  should  bear  in  mind  that  it  is exercising an extraordinary and equitable jurisdiction. As a constitutional court it has a duty to protect the rights of the citizens but simultaneously it is to keep itself  alive  to  the  primary  principle  that  when  an aggrieved  person,  without  adequate  reason, approaches the court at his own leisure or pleasure, the court would be under legal obligation to scrutinise whether the lis at a belated stage should be entertained or not. Be it noted, delay comes in the way of equity. In certain  circumstances  delay  and  laches  may  not  be fatal but in most circumstances inordinate delay would only invite disaster for the litigant who knocks at the doors  of  the  court.  Delay  reflects  inactivity  and inaction on the part of a litigant—a litigant who has forgotten the basic norms, namely, 'procrastination is the  greatest  thief  of  time'  and  second,  law  does  not permit one to sleep and rise like a phoenix. Delay does bring in hazard and causes injury to the lis.' In Union of India v. N. Murugesan, (2022) 2 SCC 25, court has observed that a neglect on the part of a party to do an act which law requires must stand in his way for getting the relief or remedy. The Court laid down two essential factors i.e. first, the length of the delay and second, the developments during the intervening period. Delay in availing the remedy would amount to waiver of such right. Relevant extracts of the judgment read as: "20.  The  principles  governing  delay,  laches,  and acquiescence  are  overlapping  and  interconnected  on MANOJ KUMAR

many  occasions.  However,  they  have  their  distinct characters  and  distinct  elements.  One  can  say  that delay is the genus to which laches and acquiescence are species. Similarly, laches might be called a genus to  a  species  by  name  acquiescence.  However,  there may be a case where acquiescence is involved, but not laches.  These  principles  are  common  law  principles, and  perhaps  one  could  identify  that  these  principles find place in various statutes which restrict the period of  limitation  and  create  non-consideration  of condonation in certain circumstances. They are bound to be applied by way of practice requiring prudence of the  court  than  of  a  strict  application  of  law.  The underlying principle  governing  these  concepts  would be one of estoppel. The question of prejudice is also an important issue to be taken note of by the court.

21.  The  word  "laches"  is  derived  from  the  French language meaning "remissness and slackness". It thus involves unreasonable delay or negligence in pursuing a  claim  involving  an  equitable  relief  while  causing prejudice to the other party. It is neglect on the part of a party to do an act which law requires while asserting a  right, and  therefore,  must stand  in  the  way  of  the party getting relief or remedy.

22. Two essential factors to be seen are the length of the  delay  and  the  nature  of  acts  done  during  the interval. As stated, it would also involve acquiescence on the part of the party approaching the court apart from  the  change  in  position  in  the  interregnum. Therefore,  it  would  be  unjustifiable  for  a  Court  of Equity to confer a remedy on a party who knocks its doors when his acts would indicate a waiver of such a right. By his conduct, he has put the other party in a particular  position,  and  therefore,  it  would  be

unreasonable to facilitate a challenge before the court. 'hus, a man responsible for his conduct on e$uity is not e#pected to be allowed to a!ail a remedy.1

¶9In the absence of any plausible reason advanced by petitioner for filing instant petition after almost 5 years of passing of impugned order, this Court finds that present petition suffers from delay and laches. Thus, the petition deserves to be dismissed on the ground of delay and laches.

¶10Dismissed.

2+.11."2"(            2JAG,OHAN BAN)A.3 manoj              JUDGE

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