Himani Sharma Alias Himani Bhandari v. State of Haryana and Anr

ANOOP CHITKARA, J. FIR No. Dated Police Sta-on Sec-ons 317 01.07.2023 Baldev Nagar, Ambala 406, 420 IPC The pe!!oner, arraigned as accused in the above cap!oned FIR, has come up before this Court under Sec!on 482 CrPC for quashing of the FIR and all consequen!al proceedings based on the compromise with the aggrieved person.

¶2During the pendency of the criminal proceedings, the accused and the aggrieved person have compromised the ma;er, and its copy is annexed with this pe!!on as Annexure P-2.

¶3A=er that, the pe!!oner came up before this Court to quash the FIR, impleading the aggrieved person as respondent no.2.

¶4Pursuant to order of this Court dated 28.08.2024, the aggrieved person (R-2), appeared before the Chief Judicial Magistrate, Ambala and stated that there would be no objec!on if the Court quashes this FIR and consequent proceedings. As per the concerned court's report dated 18.10.2024, the par!es consented to the quashing of FIR and consequent proceedings without any threat or coercion. order/judgment. 1

ANALYSIS & REASONING:

¶5Despite the severe opposi!on of the State's counsel to this compromise, the following aspects would be relevant to conclude this pe!!on: - a) The accused and the private respondent have amicably se;led the ma;er between them in terms of the compromise deed and the statements recorded before the concerned Court; b) A perusal of the documents reveal that the se;lement has not been secured through coercion, threats, social boyco;s, bribes, or other dubious means; c) The aggrieved person has willingly consented to the nullifica!on of criminal proceedings; d) There is no objec!on from the private respondent in case present FIR and consequent proceedings are quashed; e) In the given facts, the occurrence does not affect public peace or tranquillity, moral turpitude or harm the social and moral fabric of the society or involve ma;ers concerning public policy; f) The rejec!on of compromise may also lead to ill will. The pendency of trial affects career and happiness; g) There is nothing on the record to prima facie consider the accused as an unscrupulous, incorrigible, or professional offender; h) The purpose of criminal jurisprudence is reformatory in nature and to work to bring peace to family, community, and society;

i) The exercise of the inherent power for quashing FIR and all consequen!al proceedings is jus!fied to secure the ends of jus!ce.

¶6In the present case, the offence under sec!on 406, 420 IPC, 1860 are compoundable under Sec!on 320 of Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (CrPC).

¶7In C.B.I., New Delhi v. Duncans Agro Industries Ltd., Calcu;a, 1996(5) SCC 591, Hon'ble Supreme Court holds, [26]. A=er giving our careful considera!on to the facts and circumstances of the case and the submissions made by the respec!ve counsel for the par!es, it appears to us that for the purpose of quashing the complaint, it is necessary to consider whether the allega!on in the complaint prima facie make out an offence or not. It is not necessary to scru!nise whether the allega!ons are likely to be upheld in the trial. Any ac!on by way of quashing the complaint is an ac!on to be taken at the threshold before evidences are led in support of the complaint. For quashing the complaint by way of ac!on at the threshold, it is, therefore, necessary to consider whether on the face of the JYOTI allega!ons, a criminal offence is cons!tuted or not. order/judgment. 2

[29]. In the facts of the case, it appears to us that there is enough jus!fica!on for the High Court to hold that the case was basically a ma;er of civil dispute. The Banks had already filed suits for recovery of the dues of the Banks on account of credit facility and the said suits have been compromised on receiving the payments from the concerned Companies. Even if an offence of chea!ng is prima facie cons!tuted, such offence is a compoundable offence and compromise decrees passed in the suits ins!tuted by the Banks, for all intents and purposes, amount to compounding of the offence of chea!ng. It is also to be noted that long !me has elapsed since the complaint was filed in 1987. It may also be indicated that although such FIRs were filed in 1987 and 1989, the Banks have not chosen to ins!tute any case against the alleged erring officials despite allega!ons made against them in the FIRs. Considering that the inves!ga!ons had not been completed !ll 1991 even though there was no impediment to complete the inves!ga!ons and further inves!ga!ons are s!ll pending and also considering the fact that the claims of the Banks have been sa!sfied and the suits ins!tuted by the Banks have been compromised on receiving payments, we do not think the said complaints should be pursued any further. In our view, proceeding further with the complaints will not be expedient. In the special facts of the case, it appears to us that the decision of the High Court in quashing the complaints does not warrant any interference under Ar!cle 136 of the Cons!tu!on. We, therefore, dismiss these appeals.

¶8In Nikhil Merchant vs C.B.I. & Anr, Cr.A 1302 of 2008, Hon'ble Supreme Court holds, [22]. Despite the ingredients and the factual content of an offence of chea!ng punishable under Sec!on 420 IPC, the same has been made compoundable under Sub-sec!on (2) of Sec!on 320 Cr.P.C. with the leave of the Court. Of course, forgery has not been included as one of the compoundable offences, but it is in such cases that the principle enunciated in B.S. Joshi's case (supra) becomes relevant. [23]. In the instant case, the disputes between the Company and the Bank have been set at rest on the basis of the compromise arrived at by them whereunder the dues of the Bank have been cleared and the Bank does not appear to have any further claim against the Company. What, however, remains is the fact that certain documents were alleged to have been created by the appellant herein in order to avail of credit facili!es beyond the limit to which the Company was en!tled. The dispute involved herein has overtones of a civil dispute with certain criminal facets. The ques!on which is required to be answered in this case is whether the power which independently lies with this Court to quash the criminal proceedings pursuant to the compromise arrived at, should at all be exercised? [24]. On an overall view of the facts as indicated hereinabove and keeping in mind the decision of this Court in B.S. Joshi's case (supra) and the compromise arrived at between the order/judgment. 3

Company and the Bank as also clause 11 of the consent terms filed in the suit filed by the Bank, we are sasfied that this is a fit case where technicality should not be allowed to stand in the way in the quashing of the criminal proceedings, since, in our view, the connuance of the same a=er the compromise arrived at between the pares would be a fule exercise.

¶9In Shakuntala Sawhney v Kaushalya Sawhney, (1979) 3 SCR 639, at P 642, Hon'ble Supreme Court observed that the finest hour of Jusce arises propiously when pares, who fell apart, bury the hatchet and weave a sense of fellowship or reunion.

¶10In the light of the judicial precedents referred to above, given the terms of compromise, placement of pares, and other factors peculiar to the case, the contents of the compromise deed and its objecves point towards its acceptance.

¶11In Himachal Pradesh Cricket Associaon v State of Himachal Pradesh, 2018:INSC:1039 [Para 47], 2018 (4) Crimes 324, Hon'ble Supreme Court holds "[47]. As far as Writ Peon (Criminal) No. 135 of 2017 is concerned, the appellants came to this Court challenging the order of cognizance only because of the reason that ma;er was already pending as the appellants had filed the Special Leave Peons against the order of the High Court rejecng their peon for quashing of the FIR/Chargesheet. Having regard to these peculiar facts, writ peon has also been entertained. In any case, once we hold that FIR needs to be quashed, order of cognizance would automacally stand viated."

¶12Considering the enre facts, compromise, and in the light of the above-menoned judicial precedents, I believe that connuing these proceedings will not suffice any fruiVul purpose whatsoever. In the facts and circumstances peculiar to this case, the Court invokes the inherent jurisdicon under secon 482 CrPC/528 BNSS, 2023 and quashes the FIR and all subsequent proceedings qua the peoner. The bail bonds of the peoner are accordingly discharged. Pe--on allowed in the terms men-oned above. All pending applicaon(s), if any, stand closed. (ANOOP CHITKARA) JUDGE December 12, 2024 Jyo-II : : order/judgment.

IN THE HIGH COURT OF PUNJAB AND HARYANA AT CHANDIGARH CRM-M-59433-2023 (O&M) Reserved on: 03.12.2024 Date of Pronouncement: 12.12.2024 Himani Sharma @ Himani Bhandari ... Pe!!oner Versus State of Haryana and another …Respondents CORAM: HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE ANOOP CHITKARA Present:- Ms. Aayushi Jindal, Advocate for Mr. Umesh Aggarwal, Advocate, for the pe!!oner. Mr. Rajat Gautam, Addl. A.G. Haryana. Mr. Gaurav, Advocate for Mr. Prateek Sodhi, Advocate, for respondent No.2. ***