Capt. Karam Singh Since Deceased Through His Lr Joginder Singh v. The Financial Commissioner, Revenue and Secretary to Govt. of Punjab and Ors

INoTHEoHIGHoCOURToOFoPUNJABoANDoHARYANA AToCHANDIGARH LPA-147-2026o(O&M) D !"o#$oD"%&'&#()oti*+03+2026 CAPT. KARAM SINGH SINCE DECEASED THROUGH HIS LR JOGINDER SINGH ...Appellant Versus THE FINANCIAL COMMISSIONER, REVENUE AND SECRETARY TO GOVT. PUNJAB, REHABILITATION DEPARTMENT AND ORS ...Respondents CORAM)o HON,BLEoMR+oJU-TICEoHAR-IMRANo-INGHo-ETHI HON,BLEoMR+oJU-TICEo.I/A-o-URI Present:& Mr. G.S. Nagra, Advocate, for the appellant. ***** oHAR-IMRANo-INGHo-ETHIootioJ+o(ORAL)o

¶1In the present appeal, the challenge is to the order dated

16.10.2025 passed by the learned Single Judge in CWP&8079&1987, by which, the challenge raised to the utilizationoof the land by the Government of Punjab so as to allot the same in favour of the privateorespondents, has been upheld.o

¶2Learned counsel appearing on behalf of the appellant argues that though, the mortgagor'sorights were purchased for the land in question by the appellant on 07.12.1972, theorejection of the plea for redemption of mortgaged land by the authorities concerned is bad, and keeping in view the change of law subsequently, the same plea though dismissed at earlier stage,ocan be raised again, which fact has not been considered by the learned Single Judge in the correct perspective.

¶3We have heard learned counsel for the appellant and have gone through the record with his able assistance.

¶4It may be noticed that after purchasing the mortgagor's rights on LPA-147-2026o(O&M)ooooooooooooo(2)

07.12.1972, an application was filed by the appellant for redemption of the mortgage land on 22.07.1974, which was rejected by the Assistant Custodian, Punjab, on 29.08.1977 being time barred.oEven the revision petition filed against the said order was dismissed ono13.12.1978.o No challenge was raised to the said order till a writ petition was filed in the year 1987 challenging such order and thatotoo, after said land was acquired by the Central Government vide notification dated 21.10.1981 (Annexure P&3) and further allotted to private respondents being 'displaced persons' under Section 12 of the Displaced Persons (Compensation and Rehabilitation) Act, 1954.

¶5It is a settled principle of law that the action to challenge an order has to be done beforeoit creates third party rights.oIn the present case, after filing an application for redemption of the mortgage land in the year 1974 which was deniedoin the year 1977, the revision filed there against was also dismissed on 13.12.1978, no further action was taken by the appellant for a period of approximately 09 years prior to the filing of the writ petition at the hands of the appellant in 1987 and in the meanwhile, said land in question had already been allotted by the State in favour of the private respondents.o Once, third party interest had already come into play and the challengeoto the orders denying the redemption of the mortgage land was passed 10 years prior toothe filing of the writ petition, whether such redemption of mortgaged land could have beenoallowed, could not have been undertaken, especiallyowhen the utilisation of the said land had already been done by the State.

¶6Even otherwise, as per the judgement of the Hon'ble Supreme LPA-147-2026o(O&M)ooooooooooooo(3) Court of India in in Civil Appeal No.1852 of 1989 with Civil Appeal No. 4772 of 1989 titled as 'State of Punjab and others vs. Gurdev Singh and Ashok Kumar, decided on 21.08.1991, that every order passed in case, causes prejudice, has to be challenged within a period of three years. The relevant paragraphs of the said judgment are as under:&

¶4First of all, to say that the suit is not governed by the law of Limitation runs afoul of our Limitation Act. The statute of limitation was intended to provide a time limit for all suits conceivable. Section 3 of the Limitation Act provides that a suit, appeal or application instituted after the prescribed "period of limitation" must subject to the provisions of Sections 4 to 24 be dismissed although limita& tion has not been set up as a defence, Section2(J) defines the expression "period of limitation" to mean the period of limitation prescribed in the Schedule for suit, appeal or application. Section 2(J) also defines, "prescribed period" to mean the period of limitation computed in accordance with the provisions of the Act. The Court's function on the presentation of plaint is simply to examine whether, on the assumed facts the plaintiff is within time. The Court has to find out when the "right to sue" accrued to the plaintiff. If a suit is not covered by any of the specific articles prescribing a period of limitation, it must fail within the residuary article. The purpose of the residuary article is to provide for cases which could not be covered by any other provision in the Limitation Act. The residuary article is applicable to every variety of suits not otherwise provided for. Article 113 (corresponding to Article 120 of the Act 1908) is a residu& ary article for cases not covered by any other provisions in the Act. It prescribes a period of three years when the right to sue accrues. Under LPA-147-2026o(O&M)ooooooooooooo(4) Article 120 it was six years which has been reduced to three years under Article 113. According to the third column in Article 113, time commences to run when the right to sue accrues. The words "right to sue" ordinarily mean the right to seek relief by means of legal proceedings. Generally, the right to sue accrues only when the 'cause of action arises, that is, the right to prosecute to obtain relief by legal means. The suit must be instituted when the right asserted in the suit is infringed or when there is a clear and unequivocal threat to infringe that right by the defendant against whom the suit is insti& tuted (See: (i) Mt. Bole v. Mt. Koklam and Ors., AIR 1930 PC 270 and (ii) Gannon Dunkerley and Co. v. The Union of India, AIR 1970 SC 1433). 8. It will be clear from these principles, the party aggrieved by the invalidity of the order has to approach the Court for relief of declaration that the order against him is inoperative and not binding upon him. He must approach the Court within the prescribed period of limitation. If the statutory time limit expires the Court cannot give the declaration sought for. 11. The Allahabad High Court in Jagdish Prasad Mathur and Ors. v. United Provinces Government, AIR 1956 All 114 has taken the view that a suit for declaration by a dismissed employee on the ground that his dismissal is void, is governed by Article 120 of the Limitation Act. A similar view has been taken by Oudh Chief Court in Abdul Vakil v. Secre& tary of State and Anr., AIR 1943 Oudh 368. That in our opinion is the correct view to be taken. A suit for declara& tion that an order of dismissal or termination from service passed against the plaintiff is wrongful, illegal or ultra vires is governed by Article 113 of the Limitation Act The decision to the contrary taken by the Punjab & Haryana High Court in. these and other cases ((i)State of LPA-147-2026o(O&M)ooooooooooooo(1) Punjab v. Ajit Singh,. [1988] 1 SLR 96 and (ii) State of Punjab v. Ram Singh, [1986] 2 SLR 379 is not correct and stands overruled."

¶7Hence, challenging an orderopassed in the year 1978, in the year 1987 and that too, when the land in question had already beenoallotted to the private respondents, such belated challenge could not have been undertaken and had rightly been dismissed by the learned Single Judge. oIt may be noticed that after the order was passed in 1978 denying the redemption of theomortgage, the challengeowas made to the allotment in favour of the private respondents. Once, the challengeoto redeem the then mortgaged land had already failed and the ownership of such land was never invested oin favour of the appellant, challenging the allotment of the land in the favour of the private respondent was rightly rejected. oIt is only when the said rejection had also attained finality while filing theowrit petition, as an abundant caution, an order passed a decade ago was challengedoso as to show the bona fide, which actions of the appellant haveorightly been rejected by the learned Single Judge.

¶8No other argument has been raised.

¶9In view of the above, no ground is made out for any interference by this Court and the present appeal is accordingly dismissed.

¶10Pending applications, if any, also stand disposed of. (oHAR-IMRANo-INGHo-ETHIo) JUDGE (o.I/A-o-URIo) M 2%3oti*0o2026 JUDGE