Delhi Transco Limited & Anr v. Hythro Engineers Pvt Ltd

a' b I2 $^ * o./ /o II\ TTIE IIIG}I COUITT OF DEI,ITI-AT NEW Dtr]I,HI o.M.P.7s6l201r Judgment Deliverecl on: 05.01 -2012 DIiLIII'I'I{ANSCO LIMITI]D & ANR ..... Pctitioncr Through: Mr.S.K. Dubey, Mr.Vibhor Gr-rpta and Mr.Vivek. Advocates VCTSUS IffllUtO ItNGINlitiitS t'V't'L'I'D ..... I(cspondent 'l'hrough: Mr.Dhanncsh Misra, Mr.Siddhant Asthana and Mr.Gaurav Malik. Advocatcs (-'0trtAM: I ION',[}LT] MI{. JUSTICXI G.S.SISTANI c.$.SISTANI. J. (O/1,{/.) IA"No. L637ll20lI t. 'I'his is an application under Section 151 CI'}C reacl with Seotion 5 of thc l,imitation Ac1, sccking condonalion of ticlay in rc-filing tho pctition unclcr Scction 34 ofthc Arbitration & Conc,iliation r\ct. Ilcl-orc ctealing with tlic rival subinissions of counscl for thc partics, thc undisputcd lacts rnay bc noticcd. In this case, the arbitrator rendercd his award on23.02.201 I and on atl application filcd by rcspondcnt hercin, thc awarcl was mocliliccl b1' ap ordcr datcd 22.04.2011. Thc petitioncr admittcdly filcd his ob.icctions to thc awatd within' thc pcriod ol limitation i.e. within 90 days orr 01 .07.20 I 1 . 'i hc objcctions wcrc rcturnccl by thc Rcgistry, and rc-llled on

21.09.2011 resulting in 72 days dclay in rc-filing.

¶3'fhc grounds seeking condonation of dclay havc bccn sct out in 3af) ili a o.!J[. P. 756/201 I I'uru I of 13 \,7 paragraphs 2, 3 and 4 of the application. I deern it appropriate to rcproducc thc satnc. "2. That thc petitioncr had filcd thc aforcsaid petition on

02.07.201I vidc diary no.91466 in. thc lcgistry of this Ilon'ble Court which was returncd undcr objections on

05.07 .20II. 'I'he samc was collcctcd by the junior counsel as thc clcrk of thc counsel for the petitioncr was on leave those days. lJnfiortunately the pctitionct' aftcr taking undcr objections was tagged with other hlcs and thcrcforc rcmaincd untraccablc till 18.09.2011. lJltimatcly thcr officc of the pctitioners counsel started reconstructing thc rccorcl foi the fresh filing.

¶3In the mcanwhilc on 19.09.2011 thc counsel of the petitioner whilc making scarch lbr sornc othcr filcs suddenly found the petition aforesaid and thcrc is a dclay of about 50 days in rcfilling the above said pctition.

¶4That thc delay in rcfilling thc aforesaid petition is . ncithcr dclibcratc nor intentional, but has occured due to bonafidc reasons, explained hercin abovc. It is submittcd that if thc delay is not condoned, thc petitioncr shall suffcr loss and injury."

¶4Mr.Dubcy, learned counsel for the petitioner subrnits that the delay in re-frling was ncithcr intcntional nor on account of carclessness or racklcssncss on bchalf of counsel for thc plainliff. It is submitted that the objcctions were tagged with another file and thercforc, rcmaincd untraced rjll 18.09.2011 and thcrcaflcr thc counscl for thc pctitioner while searching for another file carre across thc samc on 19.09.2011. IIc furlhcr subrnits that this courl has wide powers to condone the delay in re-filing, as tho rigors of condonation of delay in rc-filing arc not as stringent as condonation of delay in filing objection under Section 34 of the Arbitration & Conciliation A6t, 1996. Counscl furlher submits that in case a party is able to show sufficient grounds to mcct thc cnds of justice -t-l ra-o.M.P, 756/20r t I'uge 2 of I3 %

¶5Court shcluld cnsllre that a mcritorious tnattct' is not thrown out . on tcchnicalitics and thc courls must excrcisc its disorction in favour of the pctitioner and decide the matter on merits. Counsel for thc rcspondent has vehernently opposed this application. 'fhe first submission of Mr.Misra, counsel for thc rcspondcnt is that an application under Section 5 of the Lirnitation Act, is not rnaintainable. In support of this subrnission coutlscl for thc respondent has relied upon a judgmcnt rcndcred by Division IJcnch of this Court tn M/s. Competent Placement Services througlt its Director/ Psrtner Vs. Delhi Trans-ort Cornoration tlrouglt its Chairmon 20lI (2) R.n.J. 347 (Delhi). Thc seconcl subrnission of counsel for the respondcnt is that thc application filed by the petitioner is extremely casual in naturc and it lacks material particulars and no sufficient grotrnds are madc out fol condoning lhc dclay in rc-filing the objections. Counsel also submits that having regard to tlre dccision of thc Apcx Court in thc casc of Union of' Indis Vs. Popular Construction CO. (2001) 8 SCC 410, thc Suprcrirc Courl has lreld that no petition under Scction 34 of thc Arbitration & Conciliation Act, can bc cntcflaincd beyond 90+30 days. It is contendcd that in casc delay in refiling is concloncd without any cogcnt rcason, it would run contrary to thc mandatc of thc Lcgislaturc and thc law laid down by the Apcx Court. 'l'hc third subrnission of counscl for the rcspondent is that cvcn olhcrwisc, the prescnt application cannot be entertained, as the application has not been re-filcd within thc tirnc allowcd by the Itcgistry. Keeping in view the Rule 5 Chapter '1' of Volume V of Iligh Court Itulcs and.Orders, which provides that the Deputy I{egistrar, Assistant l{cgistrar, may spccify thc ob.jcctions and return for amendment and rc-hling within a timc not cxccccling 7 days at a tirne and 30 days in aggrcgatc to'6e fixed by hirn. And furthcr in casc thc re-hling is not <lone within thc tirne \i dlr

0.'V.I'. 756/201I l'aga 3 of 13

¶6allowcd and bcyond 30 days it would atnount to fi'csh filing. Elaborating his argument furlher counsel for thc rcsponclcnt submits that in thc facts of this case, the objcctions wcl'c filcd on 0I.07.2011 an<l returned on 05.07.2011, and the objections werc to bc rcmovcd within 7 days. Since, adrnittedly the objections were not rcmovcd within thc time allowed, and beyond 30 days it would amount to fiesh filing of the objcotions, and thus would bc scluarely hit by the dccision rcndercd by the tlris Courl in thc casc of Competent Placement Services (Supra). Mr.Misra has also placcd rcliancc in support of this argument on a dccision rendcrcd by another Single Judgc of this Court in thc casc of M/sGautsm Associotes Vs, Food Corporstion of'India (2010) 2 I{.A.J. 595 l)clhi. In response to thc submission made by counsil for the rcspondcnt, Mr.Dubcy, counscl for the petitioner has drawn attention of the Clourt to tlrc obscrvations made by the Division Bench in thc casc of Competent Placement Services (Supral and more partioularly paragraph 9, which is rcproduccd bclow: "9. In thc light of thesc provisions and dccisions rcndcrcd by thc Ilon'blc Strprcmc Couft, it is thus clcar that no petition under Scction 34 of the A&C Act can be entertained after a period of three rnonths plus a frrrther period of 30 days, subjcct to showing sufficient causc, beyond which no institution is pcrrnissible. Ilowcver, thc rigors of condonation of delay in rehling ate not as strict as condonation of dclay of filing ttncler Section 34(3). Ilut that does not rrean that a party can bc pcnnittcd an indcfinite and uncxplainablc pcriod for re[rlling thc petition." WHi.[0lrelylnL'i:ii the aforesaid paragraph, Mr.Dubcy subrnits that there is arnplc powcl's with the Couil to condone the delay even if the objections worc filcd bcyond thc period of 30 days, as Division lJcnch has held that rigors of condonalion of dcla-v in rc-filing arc not as strict as condonation V IX, l. tt. o.xI.P. 756/201 I I'agc 4 oflS Y

¶9of delay of filing pctition under Section 34 (3) of thc Arbitration & Conciliation Act. I'o buttress his argument fufther, Mr.Dubey coLlnsel fo5 the petitioner subrnits that while deciding the rnatter thc Division Bcnch has noticed the Dclhi Iligh Court Rules and thus thiS court should exercise discretion in favour of thc pctitioncr and condone delay of 12 days. Counscl for the pctitioncr has also rclied uporl Union of' India Vs. Mohem Lol Harbanslsl Bhuvaita & Co. [2001 (4) RAJ 248 (Dcl.)1, and more particularly paragraphs 5, 7 and 9, which read as undcr: "5. Section 34(3) of the Act provides that period for lirnitation within which an application can bc filcd for sctting aside o1-the award. It is thrcc rnonths fi'om thc datc of receipt ol'the arbitral award or if rcclucst has bccn made under Section 33 fi'orn thc date on which such rcclucst has been disposcd of. 'I'hcrc is a proviso to sub-section (3) to Section 34 which permits that courl to condonc thc dclay if there is a sttfftcicnt causc for making thc application beyond three ' months but 30 days is the outcr lirnit in this regard. In other words, aftcr thc expiry of 30 days delay cvcn caunot bc condoncd. In thc prescnt casc in hand, thc revicw petitions had bccn filed and was finally disposed of on 10th February, 2000. Objcctions havc been filed on 25th Muy, 2000 i.e. to say after the expiry of the three rnonths period. 'l'he short question 'Iherefore that arises for considcration is that whcther thcrc was sufficicnt causc for rnaking thc application beyond thtee months. Thc cxprcssion 'sufficicnt cause' as such has not been defined.. Ilvcn it is not dcfincd in thc Lirnitation Aot bccausc nccessarily lacts of each case has to bc cxamincd on its own mcrit. I3y the large the meaning of sufhcicnt causc rnust be drawn as it exists in Section 5 of the Limitation Act, 1963. This question as to what would be the rneaning of sufficient cause came up for considcration beforc +' tirb Suprcmc Courl in thc casc of Shakuntala Devi Jain Vs. Kuntal Kumar & Ors. AII{ 1969 SC 575. 'I'hc Supreme court hcld that the expression sufficient oause should be given a liberal meaning and in this regard while approving thc carlicr decision of the Madras Fligh Court hcld: v * O.tr{.P. 756/201 I I'uge 5 of 13 \t \\ ,/

¶7'l'hc next question is whethcr thc dclay in filing thc cerlilied copy or, to put it differently, the delay in re-hling the appeal with the certified copy should be condoned under Section 5 of the Lirnitation Act. If the appcllant makes out sufficicnt causc for thc dclay the Couft may in its discrclion condonc thc dclay. As laid down in Krishna v. Chathappan. 1890 13 Mad 269 ': "section 5 gives the Courts a discrction which in ' respect of jurisdiction is to bc cxcrciscd in thc way in which judicial power and discrction ought to be cxercised tlpon principles which are well understood; the words "sufficient cause" rcceiving a liberal construction so as to advancc substantial justice when no ncgligence nor inaction nor want of bona fidcs is imputablc to thc appellant."

¶6xxxxx 7 . From the perusal of what has been reproduced abovc, the conclusions can convcnicntly be drawn that the Lcgislaturc in its rvisdorn did not dcfinb the expressipn sufhcient cause. l'his is for the rcason that facts of cach case necessarily have to vary. 'fhc prccisc factual rcasons for dclay within the gcneral arnbit of thc cxprcssion sufficient causc must bc established and that too to the satisfaction of the courl. I{owever, the powels of thc court havc not'to be exercised arbitrarily. fhey havc to bc wcighcd on judicial scales. But the said powcr must bc cxcrciscd to advancc the substantial justice rather than confinc to thc narrow colnpass. If a party is negligent and not intercstcd ncccssarily i1 will not be a sufficient cause for condcnsation of dclay. One would hasten to add that as notcd abovc, thctc cannot bc a precisc and definite conclusion in this rcgard bccausc it is the facts of the casc which take prorninence and the -|r'ont seat.

¶9llowevcr, learned counscl for thc rcspondcnt highlighted thc fact that despite such a fact that objections were filed within 30 days of the expiry of the lirnitation thrcc months still when thc same were returncd, again lor 2-ll2 rnonths the objcctions wcro not filed. The plea already rcproduced abovc on bchalf of the petitioner, is that the filc after it was rcturncd was rnixed up with cedain othcr filcs and was traced by thc a o.tv.P. 756/20t 1 ffi t+ +: -x *it ffi *8ftEl$ I'ogc 6 of 13 \d\/ \> counsel only after thc departtnent askcd about ncxt date of ,. hearing. 'Ihere is prccious littlc on the rccord to disbelieve. . Othcrwise also once he objections had becn filed and dclay " had been condoned as recorded above, it shows that the pctitioner indced was intcrestcd in pursuing the matter. The said delay also is condoned on paymcnt of Rs.2,000/- as costs."

¶10I havc heard counsel for the parlies and also considcrcd thcir rival contcntions. In the casc of Executive Engineer Vs. Sltree Ram Construction Co.2010 (120) DI{J at pagc 615, thc Division IJench has observed that there is a pressing nced to bring adjudicatory proccedings to a prornpt and expeditious conclusion, especially wherc cornlllcrcial and busincss contracts arise. In the case of Executive Engineer (Suprs) the Division Ilench had an occasion to deal with four petitions lI--AO(OS)I which had been filcd against differcnt orders of a Single Judge of this Court. I'he relevant paragraphs 29 and 41 of the Judgrncnt arc rcproduced bclow: "29. Itcliancc on thc dccision in Improverncnt 'I'rust, Ludhiana -vs-Ujagar Singh, (2010) 6 SCC 786 to thc cffcct that'Justicc can be donc only whcn thc rnatter is fought on merits and in accordance with law rathcr than to dispose it off on such technicalities and that too at the threshold" is of no avail in the backdrop of the A&C Act which decidcdly and calculatedly shuts off curial discrction afler thc cxpiry of thirty days beyond three months having elapsed from 1hc datc on which a copy of the Award had been received by the appcaling party. In the contcxt of the A&C Act, it appears to us that liberalitv in condonin inp. would run countcr to the arliarncnt which has cmnlo facial,l:v prescribe a cut off date be]'ond which thcrc is no latitude {bi cgndonation of dclay. And this is for very good reason. Across thc Globc, it has b.cen acccptcd that thcrc is a pressing need to bring adjudjcatory procccdings to a prornpt and cxpeditious conclusion, cspccially whcrc comrncrcial and business conflicts arise. We think it wtiolly impcnnissible to extend or expand the time for concluding judicial procecdings at thc sccond stage, that is, that of

0.tr|.1'. 75(r/201I I'age 7 of'13 \s, 9/ refi.ling, when this is imperrnissible at the vcry initial stagc, that is, of filing objections to an award. It will be appositc to immediately . rccall thc dicta of lJnion of India -vs-PoPular Construction ' Cornpany, (2001) 8 SCC 470. We can do no better than reiterate the words thcrcin -"thc history and schctnc of thc 1996 Act supports tlrc conclusion that the timc-limit prescribcd undcr Scction 34 lo challcngc an award is absolute and unextcndible by Couft undcr Scction 5 of the Limitation Act". 'I'his very rcasoning has also becn clarificd and followed in Chief Engineer of BPDP/IIEO, Itanchi -vs-Scoot Wilson Kirpatrick India (P) Ltd., (2006) 13 SCC 622 rn these words:-

¶8I'hc dccision in lJnion of India -vs-Popular Construction Company, (2001) 8 SCC 470 did not 'dcal with .specific issues in this case. In that dccision it was hcld thal in respect of "sufficicnt cause cases" the provisions of Section 3 (3) of thc Act which are special provisions relating to condbnation of delay ovenide the gencral provisions of Scction 5 of the Liinitation Act, 1963 (in shorl "the Limitation Act"). 'I'hc positicln was reiterated in State of Goa -vs-Wcstcrn Iluildcrs,

(2006) 6 SCC 239 and also in liairgrowth Invcstmcuts Ltd. - vs-Custodian, (2004) 11 SCC 472. 'fherc can bc no quairel rvith the proposition that Section 5 of thc Lirnitation Act providing for condonation of dclay is excluded by Section 34(3) of the Act.

¶41lhe question, which still rcquircs to bc ausrvcrcd, is whether a rcasonable explanation has bcen givcn with rcgard to delay of 258 days in the refiling of the Objections. Sincc this dclay crosses the frqntier of the statutory limit, that is, three rnonths and thirty days, we nced to consider whethcr sufficicnt causc had bccn shown for condoning the delay. The conduct of the party must pass the rigorous tcst of diligence. else the purpose of prescribing a dcfinitc and unelastic period of lirnitation is rcndercd futilc. The rcason attributed by thc Appellant for thc dclay is thc ill hcalth of thc Senior Standing Counscl. Ilowever, as has bcen pithily pointed out, thc lakalatnama contains the signaturcs of Ms Sonia Mathur, Standing Counscl for the Departrncnt; in fact, it does not bear the signature of Late Shri R.D.Jolly. Because of the explanation given in thc course of hearing, ws shall ignorc thc factum of the Vakalatnama also bcaring the signaturc of another Standing Counscl, narncly, Ms Prern Lata Bansal. We have qalled for the o.tw.P. 756/201I I'uge I of 13 ny \r records of OMI'} No.29112008 and we find that the Objections have not bccn signcd by Latc Shri It.D.Jolly but by Ms Sonia Mathur on

9.8.2007, on which date thc supporting Affidavit has also been swoln by the I)irector of Income 'I'ax. In thcsc circumstances, the illncss of Latc R.D.Jolly is obviously a smokescreen. No other cxplanation has bccn tcndered for the delay. The avowed purpose of thc. A&C Act is to expedite the conclusion of arbitral proceedings. It is with this end in vicw that substantial and far rcaching 'amendmcnts to the position prevailing under the Arbitration Act 1940 have been carried out and an altogether new statute has bcen passed. This purposc cannot be cmasculatcd by delays, intentional or gross, in the ooursc of rcfiling of the . Petition/Objections. 'fhe conduct of the Appcllant is not vcnial. We find rro crror in thc conclusion anivcd at by the learned Single Judge and accordingly dismiss thc Appcal. CM No.521212009 is also disrnissed."

¶11In tlrc casc of P.K. Ramschsndran Vs. Slate o'' Kersns & Anr. (Igg7) 7 SCC 556, the Supremc Court has held that an csscntial prc-recluisite of cxcrcising discretion to condone the delay is that thc Court must rccord its satisfaction that the explanation for delay was either reasonable or satisfactory. There is no quarrel to the proposition that the Suprernc Cout-t had consistcntly held that while dealing with the application undcr Section 5 oI thc Lirnitation Act thc Court must take a libcral approach, ancl thc applicalion for rc-filing shoulcl not bc subjectc<lto rigorous test which'are usually applicd in cascs under Section 5 of the Lirnitation Act, however, the prcsent case is to bc considered in thc light oI'thc Arbitration & Conciliation Act, 1996 and the airns and objeots of thc lcgislature.

¶12In this case thc grounds for condonalion of delay. do not inspire confidcncc. 'Ihe pctitioncr has bccn highly carlcless in pursuing re-filing of objcction. Any liberal approach in thc facts of this case would completcly run against thc intcntion of Parliarncnt, which has hxed a cut-off date beyond which there can bc no condonation of dclay. In my vicw petitioncr has not becn ablc to satisfy this courl that the dclay in re-filing *'

0.M.P. 756/20r t i'oge 9 of 13 \> the objection was on acioun t of bonaficle rcasons, but on thc contrary the dclay was on account of thc carelessness, inaction ancl negligcnce on the part of thc pctitioncr. Adrnittcdly the pctitioncr has thc bcnefit of a legal departrnent, it is their responsibility to see that the objections are filed r,vithin the period of lirnitation. It is also thcir rcsponsibility to cnsure that half baked objections are not filed and thereaflcr in case any objection is raiscd the same is rernoved within the tirne allowcd and thcrcaftcr to cllsul'c that thc samc is rc-filcd, as carly as possible to safeguarcl their own interest. In case the objections wcre misplaccd thc pctilioncr should have takcn appropriatc stcps at the carlicst and not waited for 72 days. A barc reading of Rulc 5, Chapter'1', Part A of Volumc 5 of l-Iigh Courl Rules and Orders, would show that the objection can be rc-filcd within a tirnc not cxccccling 7 days at a time and 30 clays in aggrcgate to bc hxed .by the Dcputy Registrar/ Assistant Itegistrar, Incharge of.Filing Counter. Itulc 5 (3) rcad with notc also makes it abundantly clear that in case objcction is filcd bcyond the tirnc allowccl by thc Dcputy Itegistrar/Assistant Registrar', Inchargc of the ltiling Countcr under Sub-I{ulc 1, it ihall bc considercd as a l}esh institution although thc ordcr passcd by the Deputy Itegistrar, Assistant Registrar, Inchargc of Filing Cor-rnlel can bc assailed by hling an appeal to the Judge in Chainbcr and in case the Court cornes to the conclusion that the party was prcvcntcd fiorn suffircicnt causc in not cornplying with I{ulc 5 (1) (A) thc Court would not bc powcrless in condoning the delay. It may bc noticed that in the prcscnt case no such appeal has bcen filed. I have carcfully examincd thc application, which has bcen Iiled seeking condonation of dclay. Ihe consistcnt view of Courts has bccn that befote considcring an application -lior condonation of delay and beforc oondoning the dclay thc

¶13\z IA r -t.

15.

0.M.P. 756/20t 1 I'agc l0 of l3 v Y Court rnust satisfy its'elf that a party was prcvcnted by sufficient cause lrom filing the application.

¶16There is no quarrel to the proposition and the subrnissions rnadc by counsel for the petitioner that even if Section 5 of the Limitation is not applicable to an application seeking condonation of delay in moving the application under Section 34 Sub-Section 3 of thc Act and an application sccking condonation of dclay in rc-filing, however, the courts have arnple . powcrs to condonc thc dclay in rc-filing for sufficicnt reasons. It would bc useful to reproduce Rule 5 of thc Dclhi Iligh Courl Rulcs and Order: L The Delhi High Courl Rules fiarned in excrcisc of powcr confcrred under Scctions I22 and I29 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 and Section 7 of the Delhi Iligh Court Act, 1967, ' were arnended w.e.f. 1st December, 1988 and I{ulc 5 in Chapter 1- . A (u) of Volume 5 was substituted to rcad as undcr:- "Ilulc 5(1) The Deputy Itcgistrary'Assistant I{cgistlar, In-chalge of the Iiling Counter, may spccify thc objcctions (a copy of which will bc kcpt for thc Court Record) and retutn for amendment and re-filing within a time not cxcceding 7 " days at a tirne and 30 days in aggregate to be fixcd by hirn, any melnorandnm of appeal, for the reason spccified in Order XLI, Rule 3, Civil Procedure Codc. llulc 5(2) If thc mcmorandum of appcal is not taken back, for amendment within the tirne allowed by the Deputy Itegistrar/Assistant Registrar, in charge of thc Itiling Countcr undcr sub-rule (1), it shall bc rcgistcred and listcd before thc Court for its dismissal for non-prosccution. Rule 5(3) If the mcrnorandum of appcal is filcd bcyond the tirnc allowed by thc Deputy l{cgistrar/Assistant Registrar, in ohargc of the Filing Countcr, under sub-rule (1) it shall bc considcred as fi'csh institution. Explanation: The period of seven days or thirty days mentioned above shall commence frotn thc datc. thc objcctions arc put on thc noticc board. o.tJ|.P. 756/20t I I'agc II of 13 v Note: l'he,provisions contained in Rule 5(1), 5(2) and 5(3) shall mutatis mutandis apply to all mattets, whcthcr Civil or Crirninal."

¶17Thc application to say least is extremely casual in naturc and does not discioss any spccific dctails. the application is only supporled by the affidavit of the pctitioner. 'fhe application is not supportcd cithcr by thc affidavit of the clerk, who had mis-placed thc objcctions or of thc junior counscl, who had accepted the objection fi'om thc Itegistry. 'I'hc application is blissfully silent on these issues. 1tt. Kecping in vicw thc airn and object and pulpose of legislature to lirnit the tirnc for filing thc objcction which is 90 'l-30 clays and not thcreafler, and thc clecision of the Apex Court is a mandatc that rnatlcrs perlaining to albitration & Conciliation Act, should not bc prolongecl and should be decided expeditiously. In case the delay in rc-fiiing thc objcction, is condoncd rncrely as a mattcr of routine, the aim of the legislature will be fi'ustlated. In case thc objections had becn mis-placcd thc petitioner should ha;zc immediately taken all steps available either by filing fiesh objections or such other remcdies which werc availablc to the petitioner,. who is not an uneducated illiterate individual but a company with a rcsponsiblc lcgal dcpartrncnt.

¶19'l'hc dccisions relied upon by counsel for thc potitioner arc not applicable to tlrc facts of thc prcsent case, and thc prescnt casc is fully covcred against thc pctitioncr by thc decision rendered by the Division Bench in tlre casc of Executive Engineer (Suprsl. Accordingly, thc application is withor-rt any rncrit and thc samc is dismisscd. IA.No.1637012011

¶20In view of order passed in the applieation lI.A. No.l637112011.1, thc application is disrnissed. !.

0.M.P. 7s6/20t I I'ugc I2 of13 t, O.M.P. 7s6l20ll

¶21In vicw o1'ordcr passcd in thc application lI.A. No.1637112011'1, the suit is dismissed. JANUARY 05,20L2 ssn @orl ,/- -E ._9' 3)--z{-^^*- -'- G.S.SISTANI.J tf o.tv.P. 756/20t I I'ugc 13 of I 3