Air India Ltd v. Govt of India & Ors

order of the learned Single Judge is Jn a narrow compass has arisen in the following factual backdrop. , The matter goes back to year, 1990 when, the appellant herein had issued Notification inviting applications for • . filling up of certain vacancies in category of Helper Engineer. A panel was prepared 'in the year 1990 itself, of the ' selected candidates. The validity of this panel was for a period of two years. Selected candidates were offered appointment, on the basis of their merits, from time to time as and when , vacancies arose. The term of "the panel was extended and it finally expired on 15.7.1994. No further appointments were- , made on regular basis from this panel. The appellant had also engaged different categories of casual workers. A series of writ petitions were filed by many such casual workers in this Court seeking regularization of their services. These writ petitions LPA No.734 of 2011, were filed in the year, 1994-95. In one such writ petition, viz., W.P.(C) No.4113/1994 titled'S,K. Saihi and Indian Airlines Ltd., interim order dated 07.12.1995 was passed in this Court • directing the appellant to prepare panels for engaging casual workers on a daily rated basis in different categories from amongst the casuals who had worked with the petitioner on ' daily rated basis. Pursuant.to these directions, the appellant prepared a panel and started engaging workers from this panel. This writ petition was finally decided along with other connected petitions directing the appellant to engage casual workers-on ^daily rated basis as per its requirements firstly from the panel prepared and approved on 20.11.1990.

¶2As per the appellant, since the apjoellanthad to accommodate left over persons in the selected panel prepared on 20,11.1990 on priority basis, for absorbing these persons, the appellant had no option but to discontinue.someother casual employees who were engaged later and thus, their services were discontinued. Some of these persons felt aggrieved-by the orders .passed by this Court in W.P.(C) 4113/1994. They challenged that order by filing Special Leave Petition No.16382- • ' 16399/1997, which was dismissed by the Supreme Court on

15.9.1997. Some other casual employees also filed 09.5.1997 in W.P.(C) No.4113/1994 filed Writ Petition (C) No.1644/1997 along with other petitions,in this Court in the year 1997-98 praying for regularization. In this writ petition, orders dated

21.8.1998 were passed dismissing those writ petitions as barred by constructive res judicata. SLP preferred by those LPA No.734 of 2011, LPA No.740 of 2011 &LPA No.742 of 2011 workers against was also dismissed by Supreme Court vide orders dated 121.10.1998. According to the appellant, though the matter rested at that, Delhi Offices &. Establishments Employees Union, Respondent No.2, espoused cause of these workers by sending representation to the Assistant Labour Commissioner, on behalf of these workmen, for reinstatement regularization .consequential benefits. The appellant filed reply thereto submitting that the matter had already been decided by this Court and the Supreme Court and therefore, these workers could not raise dispute of this nature. Conciliation proceedings ended in failure. Thereafter, reference order dated 22.11.2000 was made. • ' Challenging this reference order, the appellant filed W.P.(C) 2019/2001. We may point out that in the reference regularization and termination of the workmen were refused to. There was no purpose or justification in referring the issue of Vegularization which had already been decided by this Court in earlier writ petition. Realizing this mistake, counsel for the Central Government . conceded reference was not properly termed. On .this statement, writ petition was disposed of on 20.9.2004 and the order was passed in the following terms^ "Learned counsel for the Central Government says that the reference order made on 22"^ November, 2000 may ,be quashed because it is contrary to the judgment Division Bench of this Court in CW 2644/97 (Gurpal Singh &. Ors. VS-. India Airlines & Ors.) decided on 21""' August, • " 1998. - IPA No.734 of 20U, LPA No.740 of.2011 & LPA No.742 of 2011 \H / In view of tine statement of learned counsel for Central Government, that has been made on instruction, the impugned reference is quashed. Learned counsel for Respondent No.4 says that as per his instructions the aforesaid of the Division Bench of this Court is not being implemented and that he would • j., like to take steps in this regard. There is no prohibition against Respondent No.4 in taking such steps as permitted by law. However, for record, learned counsel for Petitioner says" that as far as he is . instructed, the judgment is being implemented.".

¶5Two more such references were made in a similar manner, which were also quashed in two other vyrit petitions vide orders dated 03.5.2005. :6. Thereafter, appropriate Government made another reference on 23.1.2005 with the following terms: "Whether termination services of Shri Om Prakash others by the Management of Indian Airlines Ltd. is legal and justified? If not, to what relief • they are entitled to?"

¶7Challenging this, the appellant filed W.P.(C) No.9204 of 2006, which has been decided by the. learned Single Judge of this Court vide impugned order dated p3.6.2011. While dismissing, writ petition, learned Single Judge held contention raised on the basis of which reference is challenged can be taken up before the Industrial Tribunal. Challenging tKis order, LPA No.734 of 20.11 is filed. Two other references • were made on identical terms on behalf of some other casual workers writ petition challenging those references are dismissed in a similar manner. Other two appeals challenging those orders are preferred on identical grounds. It is for this reason all these three appeals were heard together. LPA No.734 of 2011, \' ,8. Challenge to the impugned is circumscribed by the learned counsel for appellant following propositions:

(i). The dispute referred by Government for adjudication has already been adjudicated upon by this Court in various writ petitions (particulars . ' whereof are given above). Therefore, reference is barred on principle of res ' judicata/constructive res judicata. In this behalf, it was submitted disengagement of workmen was necessitated due to the judgment delivered on 09.5.1997 by the Division Bench of this Court in W.P.(C) No.4113 of 1994 in matter . of Sushi! Kumar Sami ¥s, Indian -Airlines & Others, wherein the 1993-12995 panel was set aside and the 1990 panel was restored. Some of workmen had challenged disengagement but it was held by learned Single Judge in the case of Shri JM, Biswas ¥s, Indian Airlines being W.P.(C) No.4799 of 1997 disengagement having been necessitated c under the orders of this Court, there could be no question of non-compliance with the provisions of Section 25(F),. 25-(oo) 25(g) of Industrial Dispute Act, 1947. It is, therefore, submitted present reference is not maintainable as it seeks to reopen the issues already decided by this Court. LPA No.734 of 2011, Page Q of 21 L (ii.) When first reference made was quashed set aside by this Court, there could not have been second reference on the same purported dispute. The reference is identical to earlier reference which was quashed by this Court" on a statement made by the learned Counsel for th6 Union of India earlier reference was repugnant to of the Division Bench of "this Court. The earlier reference mentions "reinstatement" "regularization". whereas present reference' deals "termination" of services. It is submitted thai; earlier reference covered termination of services for reason question of reinstatement can only arise pursuant to termination. . It is submitted that a reference once made cannot be withdrawn, cancelled or superseded if , . djspute is substantially same. The two reference specifically cover issue of disengagement/termination of workman as would also be evident from the prayers made in the writ'petitions which were subject matter of Division Bench of this Court. If the workmen were aggrieved by any action on part of appellant arising, out of Division Bench of this Court, remedy available to them would be to seek directions/clarifications from this Court and not by LPA No.734. of 2011, \1 raising any. dispute under the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947. The counsel for appellant relied upon following judgments jn support of his submissions:

(a) State of Bihar Vs. D.N, Ganguly . Ot/jers, AIR 1958 SC 1018.

(b) Shri Ambika Prasad Vs. Airlines

(NR) Ors., [W.P.(C) No.,2963 of 1998].

(c) Food Corporation of India ¥s. Union of India, 137 (2007) DLT 387.

¶9Learned counsel for the respondent, on the other hand, argued oh the same line on which the impugned proceeds. In view thereof, before discussing the respective arguments of the counsel for the parties, we would like to take stock of the impugned judgment, viz., the basis on which the said judgment is premised. • Impugned Judgment:

¶10• The first thing pointed out by the learned Single Judge is that ; the termination of services workmen represented by these workmen has not been adjudicated in any form. Earlier, few workmen had filed W.P. (C) IMo.3343/1999 wherein prayer . was made for declaring action of petitioner in terminating services of 81 workers engaged during year 1997-98 by replacing them fresh hands as arbitrary and discriminatory. This petition was contested by LPA No.734 of 2011, Page S of 21 appellant, inter alia, on ground that-if they were' aggrieved by their termination, they should invoke machinery under the I.D. Act which provides for appropriate forum for their grievance. No doubt, appellant had challenged the maintainability of the said petition also on the ground action was taken by the appellant pursuant to directions given by this Court in its judgment dated 09.5.1997 in W.P.

(C) No.4113/1994. However, this writ petition was , dismissed as withdrawn-vide dated 29.1.2002 which makes the following reading: "After some hearing, learned counsel for the petitioner seeks leave to withdraw petition liberty to approach competent authority under Industrial •, Disputes Act. Liberty granted. Petition is dismissed as withdrawn." Thus, that writ petition was not decided on merits. Rather it is . at behest of appellant's contentions appropriate forum was the Industrial Tribunal under the I.D. -Act that they approached the'machinery provided under the ID Act. Challenging reference, appellant had filed W.P.(C) No.2019/2001 on the' ground that there could not have been any reference qua, regularization as the issue of regularization had alrfeady been decided W.P.(C) No.2644/1997. This niistake was realized because of this reason, counsel for . the Central Government made statement said reference be quashed.' We have already extracted to orders passed on 29.9.2004 in the said writ petition on the basis of this statement. Fact remains validity of termination of the workmen was not decided. It is thereafter LPA No.734 of 2011, appropriate Government has made reference in . question' limiting to the termination workmen which issue has not been judiciaily tested so far. Second reason given by the-learned Single Judge is that the respondent No.l, after fully satisfying itself that pnma facie there exists an industrial dispute has made a reference to the Central Government Industrial Tribunal. It is not the case of appellant there was~ no material before Government about Its satisfaction. The third reason given, by the learned Single Judge is , that the defence of the appellant that the termination of these workmen is pursuant to the directions-in connpliance with the rendered in W.P.(C) No.2644/1997 is a matter which touches upon the merits of the case and that will haye to be considered by the Tribunal. •11. ,0n the aforesaid reasoning, the learned Single Judge dismissed the writ petition keeping it open for the appellant to take all the pleas which were raised in the petitions before the CGIT where the matters have been referred for.adjudication.

¶12In the light of the aforesaid, we now proceed to discuss propositions advanced by the learned counsel for the appellant,

(i). Whether reference Ss barred oo the prsnciple of res judicata/constructivQ res judicata? Learned counsel for the appellant insists on the applicability of principle of res judicata/constructive res judicata on the basis of following two decisions:

(a) Decision dated

09.5.1997 passed in W.P.(C) t •' No.4113/1994. . 1-PA No.734 of 2011, . qp

(b) Decision dated

10.9.1999 passed by a learned Single Judge of this Court in W.P.(C) No.4799/1997 in the case of J.D. Biswas (supra).

¶13Insofar as judgement in W.P.(C) No.4113/1994 is concerned, argument is that it was because of the directions contained in that judgment, services of these workmen were dispensed with/terminated.

¶14Insofar as contention of , appellant that . disengagement/termination of the services of the workmen is result of direction's Division Bench in W.P.(C) No.4113/1994 is concerned, we are opinion that the learned Single Judge has rightly dealt this contention. .This, at the most, would amount to defence of the appellant justifying termination. However, whether this plea is correct and whether the action taken is in compliance with the said is a matter which has to be examined by Adjudicating Authority. We may record that the learned Single Judge has pointed out the contention of both the parties on this aspect, which are as under; • • "The workers had also taken a plea before Conciliation Officer that petitioner had not prepared a seniority list and were violating the order of this court. Their stand was that the petitioner had exhausted the panel of 1990 '.and people from outside were being engaged. Their further stand was that they have a right to be considered first before outsiders were engaged. They had also taken a stand that petitioner had failed to comply with the order of this court in W.P.(C) 2644/1997 wherein directions had also been given to petitioner for considering casual workers therein as well as other similarly placed persons who had been engaged on daily rated by interim order or otherwise be given an opportunity of being considered for • regular appointment at time when petitioner would like to fill regular.vacancies. Their further stand is LPA No.734 of 2011, Page 11 of. 21 that petitioner has vacant posts and they are employing fresh hands taking th®, advantage of orders passed in WP

(C) No.4113/1994. . ;In WP

(C) 4799/1997, a casual ehiployee had challenged his termination by filing a petition under Article Constitution of India. The effect said will be seen by the Tribunal, Whether the contentions raised are correct or not are required to be examined by the Tribunal. It will not be proper for this court to take up the job of Tribunal while exercising the jurisdiction under Article

¶226It will be open to the petitioner to raise all the pleas before the Tribunal which are raised before this court."

¶15We are in agreement with the aforesaid view in dealing the contention of the appellant predicated on the judgment rendered in W.P.(C) No.4113/1994.

¶16We would like to state here that the applicability of principle of res judicata/constructive res judicata when workmen approach the ;High .Court in the first instance under Article 225 of the Constitution and after invoking that remedy, machinery under I.D. Act is invoked. In those cases where the workmen are employed with any statutory authority or other authority which is amenable to writ jurisdiction, they have option to either file writ petition (depending upon the' nature of relief Sought) or to raise industrial dispute invoking the provisions of I.D. Act if the aggrieved person is a workman within meaning of Section 2(s) of the I.D. Act. Such a workman, thus, has more than one fora to redress his grievance and he chooses any of the forum available. However, once haying . elected to choose remedy under one forum" again the same cause of action-cannot be challenged before another forum. This is based on doctrine of election. 'Doctrine of Election' is based ,on maxim "that a person cannot approbate or LRA No.734 of 2011, LPA No,.740 of 2011 & LPA No.742 of 2011 Page, 12 of 21 reprobate at the same time". This same principle is stated in White and Tudor's Leading Cases in Equity Vol. 1 and Eds. at page 444 as follows: "Election is obligation imposed upon a party by Courts of equity to choose between two inconsistent or alternative rights or claims in cases where there is clear intention of the person^from whom he derives one that he should not enjoy both." • This doctrine has been applied in India also, based; on sound public policy (see - Beepathuma Vs. Shankaranarayanaf

(1964)'5'SCR 836; R.N. Gosa'm Vs. YashpaSDhir, AIR 1993 SC 352; Shankar Ramchandra Abhyankar Vs. Krssh'najl • Dattatreya Bapat (1970) I SCK 322).

¶17Therefore, once the workers filed the writ petition and this writ .petition is dismissed, normally, they would be precluded from raising industrial dispute claiming the same relief which was the subject matter of the writ petition. This would be so even of the writ petition is dismissed in limine but by speaking order, i.e., reasons are given for dismissal of the writ petition on the ground that the petitioner was not entitled to the relief sought. In such a case, remedy under I.D. Act would not be available thereafter and would be barred on the principle of res judicata. However, position may be different if the writ petition is dismissed without passing speaking order touching upon the merits of the case. ,18. The position in law materially changes when the writ petition is dismissed in limine by a non-speaking, one word order viz. "Dismissed". It has been held principles of res judicata would not apply in such a situation. In Daryao and others Vs. LPA No.734 of 2011, state of U.P. 1961 AIR 1457^ proposition, of law was stated by tine Apex Court in-tine following words;- "We must now proceed to state our conclusion on the preliminary objection raised by the respondents. .We hold • if a writ petition filed by a party under Art. 226 is considered on the merits as a contested' matter is dismissed the decision thus pronounced would continue to bind parties unless it is otherwise modified or reversed by appeal or other appropriate proceedings permissible under the Constitution. It would not be open to a party to ignore the said judgment move this . Court under Art. 32 by an original petition made on the same facts and for obtaining' the same or similar orders or writs. If the petition filed In the high Court under Art. 226 is dismissed not on the merits but because of the laches of the party applying for the writ or because it is held that the party had an alternative remedy available to it, then the dismissal of the writ petition would not constitute a bar to a subsequent petition under Art. 32 except in cases where and if the facts thus found by the High Court may themselves be relevant even under Art.

¶32If a writ petition is dismissed in limine and an order is pronounced in behalf, whether or not dismissal would constitute a bar would depend upon nature order. If the order is on the merits it would be a bar; if the order shows the dismissal was for the reason that the petitioner was guilty of laches or that he had an alternative rerhedy it would not be a bar except in cases which we h^ve already indicated. If the petition is dismissed in limine without passing a speaking order than ' such dismissal cannot be treated as creating a bar of res judicata. It is true that,'prima facie, dismissal in limine even without passing a speaking order in that behalf may strongly suggest that the Court took the view that there was no substance in the petition at all: but in the absence of a speaking order it would not be easy to decide what factors weighed in the mind of the court and that makes it difficult and unsafe to hold that such a summary, dismissal is a dismissal on merits and as such constitutes a bar of res judicata against a similar petition filed under Art. 32." L(^A No:734 of 2011, LPA No.740 of 2011 & LPA No.742 of 2011 .19. To the same effect is the judgment of the Supreme Court in the case of Pujari Bai Vs. Madan Gopa!^ 1989 AIR 1764, the following pertinent observations were made:- "This takes us to the question of res judicata. The question is whether the suit of the-appellant was barred by res judicata in view of the summary dismissal of her writ petition earlier. It is not disputed' writ petition filed by the appellant against the order Assistant Conso'Jidation Officer was dismissed in limine. This order dated April 14, 1969 was passed by the Division Bench of Punjab and Haryana High Court. It was a one word ordqr. The'question of res judicata apparently arises when a controversy or an issue between the parties has been heard and decided. But the technical rule of res judicata, although a wholesome rule shed upon-public policy, cannot be stretched too far to bar the trial of identical issues in a separate proceeding merely on an uncertain assumption that the issues must have been decided. It is not safe to extend, the principle of-res judicata to such an extent so as to found it on mere guesswork. To illustrate our view point, we may take an example. Suppose a writ petition is . filed in a High Court for grant of a writ of certiorari to challenge some order or decision oii several grounds. If • the writ petition is dismissed after contest by a speaking order obviously it will operate as res judicata in any other proceeding, such as,- of suit, Article or Article directed from the same order or decision. If the writ petition is dismissed by a speaking order either at the threshold or after contest, say, only on the ground of laches or the availabilityof an alternative remedy, then another remedy open in law either by way of suit or any other proceeding obviously will not be barred on the principles.of res judicata. It thus becomes clear that when a writ petition after contest is disposed of on merits by a speaking order, the question decided in that petition would operate as res judicata, but not a dismissal in limine or dismissal on the ground of laches or availability of alternative remedy. The High Court courts below, therefore, were not right in throwing out the suit of the appellant on the ground of res judicata." LPA No.734 of 2011, LPA No.740 of 2011•& LPA No.742 of 2011 20'. The position of law which emerges from the aforesaid judgment, can be summarized as under: "i. If a workman files a writ petition on a particular cause of action the. said writ petition is entertained decided on merits disposed of/dismissed even in limine but by passing a speaking order, on the same cause of action the concerned employee is.precluded from raising industrial dispute. This would be so on "doctrine of election" as well as on the "principles of res judicata". - ii. In case the. writ ;petition is dismissed in limine by a nonspeaking order it would be unsafe to presume writ petition was dismissed on merits therefore in ' • such a case it could .not operate as res judicata therefore would not be a bar from raising industrial dispute."

¶21In a case where writ petition is filed, but the maintainability of the same is challenged on the ground that there is an alternate efficacious remedy under the I.D. Act and the writ petition is dismissed/withdrawn/disposed giving liberty to the appellant to invoke remedy under the I.D. Act, it would obviously be a case which is not decided on merits and the pririciple of res judicata will not apply.

¶22However, thereafter, W.P.(C) No.4799/1997 filed by Shri J.D. • Biswas was dismissed by the learned Single Judge of this Court effect thereof has not been considered by the learned Single Judge. The question would, therefore, is as to whether of the, learned Single Judge in W.P.(C) No.4799/1997 operates as res judicata in the sense whether the aforesaid issue has been determined by the Court. That was a case filed by an individual person, viz., Shri J.D. Biswas who had allpged that his termination from service was in LPA..NP.734Of 2011, LPA No.740 of 2011 &LPA No.742 of 2011 contravention of Section 25(f) and 25(g) of the I.D. Act as well as contrary to dated

09.5.1997 in W.P.(C) No.2155/1995. The appellant had contested petition on the ground that If violation of Section 25 (f) and 25 (g) of the I-.D. Act is raised, then matter' would fall within jurisdiction of Industrial Tribunal. It was also contended J.D. Biswas was given casual engagement on daily rated basis.. It was also argued Biswas other similarly situated persons were disengaged from the services in compliance the directions contained in the judgment dated

07.5.1997 in ,.V\/.P.(C) No.4113/1994 and W.P.(C) Mo.2155/1995. The Court while dismissing writ petition, inter alia, observed as under: , "5 It may be appreciated that in the instant case the termination of the petitioner's services is not by the employer for any reasons. The termination of petitioner's service has been ..necessitated on account of the directions issued by the Division bench of this court in C.W.2155/95.

¶6It is the admitted position that this petitioner filed CW 2155/95. Pending writ petition, Division I Bench of this Court passed an interim order dated

26.5.1995 directing respondent to consider , petitioner for casual job during the pendency of the writ petition. In compliance with the said interim order the petitioner was appointed casual commercial helper w.e.f.

21.2.1995 to

29.4!1997 from May 1997 to

13.8.1997. Thus, petitioner admittedly worked as casual helper from 21.2.96 to 29.4.97 i.e. for 397 days by . force o the interim order passed by this court as the respondent was directed to consider petitioner for casual work during pendency writ petition No.2155/95. But for interim order passed on

26.5.1995 petitioner petitioner would not have been ..able to work even as casual worker for the period . aforesaid and the respondent was obliged to. absorb - petitioner as a casual worker by force of said interim order. CW 2155/95 was disposed of vide order LPA No.734 of 2011, dated' 9.5.1997 whereby the Division Bench of this . '• court' quashed/set aside 1993-95 casual workers' panel as 'arbitrary directed respondent to firstly engage casuals from pre existing 1990 panel according to seniority which-led to the termination/discontinuailice petitioner's service. Thus, termination of petitioner has been in compliance directions issued In CW ^155/95. It is also not disputed that judgment order passed by the • Division Bench of this Court in CW 2155/95 was unsuccessfully carried to the Supreme Court by way of SLP tS5o.16392-16399 of 1997 and the said SLP came to be dismissed on 15.9.1995.

¶7It need hardly be said that the interim order dated

26.5.1995 being an arrangement pending final -decision in the writ petition, would end only during the life of the writ petition and not beyond and neither party can claim as. of right benefit obtained under interim arrangement. Now, simply because the petitioner worked as casual worker under the interim order passed by the • Division Bench, that would not vest any legal right in the petitioner claiming benefit at par a casual worker appointed in normal course. The provisions contained in Sections 2(oo), 25F AND 25G of the.Act would come into play provided casual' erhployment termination thereof are the. acts of violation on part employer and not in the case of the casual employment which is by force of interim order by the Court and the termination thereof consequent upon the direction by the, court in the petition wherein the rights of the parties to , - the petition got crystallized on out-come of petitioner. Termination of service consequent upon the direction to respondents, cannot be equated retrenchment so as tp attract Section 2(oo) of the Act by making Section 25F of the Act applicable." (emphasis supplied) ,

23.' We find that Shri J.D. Biswas was in the same position as these workmen. He was also petitioner who filed W.P.(C) No.2155/1995 which Was taken Up along W.P.(C) No.4113/1994 and these judgments were decided vide common judgment dated 07.5.1997. His second writ petition, viz., W.P.(C) LPA No.734 of 2011, No.4799/1997 was dismissed by a learned Single Judge of this Court on merits categorically holding his dismissal was in compliance with the said judgment dated 07.5.1997. Though that was rendered by the learned Single Judge on merits, present workmen wee not party to those proceedings', therefore, they are not bound by the decision rendered in-the case of 3.D. Biswas (supra) and on this ground, it may not be said that the principle of res'judicata applies to them. No doubt. When case is dealt by Tribunal on merits, appellant can rely upon the judgment in J.D. Biswas (supra) and the effect of that can be considered by the Tribunal. At the same time, the reference order made by the Government cannot be set aside/quashed invoking the principle of res judicata.

¶24We, thus, answer this question holding that the reference is not barred.

(ii) Whether the second reference is barred when earJier reference was quashed by this Court? •25. From the facts noted above, we have pointed out that the first reference was made on 22.11.2000, which was challenged by the , appellant in Writ Petition (Civil) No.2019/2001. This reference was quashed vide orders dated

20.9.2004 on the statement of . counsel for the Central Government as the reference included question of regularization which was contrary to the judgment dated

21.8.1998 passed in W.P.(C) No.2644/1997. Thereafter, the-present reference has been made confining to the validity of termination. The submission learned counsel for appellant was once first reference is quashed, for whatever reason, reference included validity of termination as well, the second reference cannot be made. It was argued that the appropriate remedy was to amend the reference LPA No.73.4 of 2011, LPA No.740 of 2011 & LPA No.742 of 2011 t , iX) 1?' I V. by excluding the question of reguiarization. However, the counsel for the Central Government itself conceded for quashing reference therefore, Central Government was not empowered to make another reference on the same.

¶26We are unable to accept this submission, which is hyper-technical. As pointed out above, first reference pertained to reguiarization as well as termination of services. Since question of reguiarization could not be referred as this issue had been decided by the Division "Bench of this Court, instead of amiending reference Central Government acceded to quash" thereof and to make fresh reference. There was, thus, technical error in the first reference. No doubt, the purpose could have been served by amending that reference. However, simply because that -is not done on quashing said reference (which virtually amounted to withdrawal said reference because aforesaid effect), Government : passed fresh reference order limiting it to termination, that cannot be treated as illegal. We state at the cost of repetition that the ; termination of the respondents have not been decided on merits in any proceedings till date.

¶27The judgment of the Supreme Court in D.N, Ganguly (supra) relied upon by the appellant has no bearing on the facts of this • case. In that case, the Apex Court held that the I.D. Act does not confer any power on the appropriate Government to cancel or supersede a reference made.under Section 10(1) of the I.D. Act. Here, that is not done. instead, it was the appellant itself wh6 had challenged the validityof the reference and realizing LPA No.734 of 2011, LPA No.740 of 2011.& LPA No.742 of 2011 its mistake and statement was made in the Court on the basis . . of which reference, was quashed in the Court.

¶29Judgment in the case of Food Corporsitlon of India (suprss) rendered by a learned Single Judge of this Court held that the defects in Notification cannot be supplied by mere amendment or rectification and it can only amend supplement or modified existing reference provided it is connected with the original reference. Here, the Government did not rescind or withdraw the reference. Rather, it was quashed by the Court and that too, at the instance appellant. Now, the appellant cannot turn around'and say that there cannot be any reference qua termination at all./ The upshot of the aforesaid discussion leads Us to conclude . that the impugned judgment of the learned Single Judge does • nbt call for any interference. Accordingly,these appeals are • dismissed. I, May is, 2012 pmc-ACTING CHIEF JUSTICE LPA No.734 of 2011, LPA No.740 of2011 &LPA No.742 of 2011

% IN THE HIGH COURT OF DELHI AT NEW DELHI LPA No.740 Of 2011 & LPA No.742 of 2011 Reserved on: 23''^April, 2012 Pronounced on: 18'^'^ May, 2012 1) LPA No.740/2011 & CM No.16855/2011 AIR INDIA LTD. . . . APPELLANT through : Mr. Lalit Bhasin Ms. Bhavna Dhani, Ms. Ratna D. Dhingra and Mr. Shreya S. Dabas, Advocates. VERSUS GOVT. OF INDIA & ORS. . . .RESPONDENTS through: Mr. Ashok Agarwal, Advocate for R-2. Mr. Sachin Datta, CGSC Ms. Gayatri Verma, Advocates for UOI. 2) LPA No.742/2011 & CM No.16886/2011 AIR INDIA LTD. • • • APPELLANT through : Mr. Lalit Bhasin Ms. Bhavna Dhani, Ms. Ratna D. Dhingra and Mr. Shreya S. Dabas, Advocates. VERSUS GOVT. OF INDIA & ORS. . • .RESPONDENTS through: Mr. Ashol< Agarwal, Advocate for R-2. Mr. Sachin Datta, CGSC Ms. Gayatri Verma, Advocates for UOI. CORAM HON'BLE THE ACTING CHIEF JUSTICE HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE RAJIV SAHAI ENDLAW A.K. SIKRI f Acting Chief Justice^ For Orders, see LPA No.734 of 2011. '/ r TiYe^ustice ACTI (RAJIV SAHAI ENDLAW) JUDGE MAY 18, 2012 pmc LPA Nos. LPA No.740 of 2011 &LPA No.742\f jOlJ.- € * . - ^ IN THE HIGH COURT OF DELHI ,AT NEW + . LPA Nq.734 Of 2011 • LPA No"740'df 2011 •• LPA No.742 of 2011 Reserved on;'23''''Apri!, 2012 ^ o/o Pronounced on: 18'^'" May^ 2012 ' IVLPA No.734/2011 & CM No.2217/2011 AIR INDIA LTD. - . . . APPELLANT through : Mr. Lalit Bhasin Ms. Bhavna Dhani, Ms. Ratna D. Dhingra and Mr. Shreya S. Dabas, Advocates. • VERSUS GOVT. OF INDIA & ORS. !. .RESPONDENTS through: Mr. Ashok Agarwal, Advocate for R- ,2. •, ' "Mr; Sachin Datta, CGSC Ms. . Gayatri Verma, Advocates for UOI. 2) LPA NO..740/2011 & CM No.16855/2011 ASR INDIA LTD. ...APPELLANT through : Mr. Lalit Bhasin Ms. Bhavna Dhani, Ms. Ratna D. Dhingra and Mr. Shreya S. Dabas, Advocates. • VERSUS GQfVT. OF INDIA &ORS. . . ^RESPONDENTS through: Mr. Ashok Agarwal, Advocate for R- 2. Mr. Sachin Datta, CGSC Ms. . Gayatri Verma, Advocates for UOI. 3) LPA No.742/2011 & CM No.16886/2011 AIR INDIA LTD. • ' • ...APPELLANT • LPA No.734 of 2011, LPA No.740 of 2011 & LPA No.742 of 2011 V- through : Mr. Lalit Bhasin Ms. Bhavna • Dhani, Ms. Ratna D. Dhingra and Mr. Shreya S. Dabas, Advocates. .VERSUS - . GOVT. OF INDIA & ORS. . . .RESPOIMDENTS through: Mr. Ashok Agarwal, Advocate for R- . 2. . Mr. Sachin Datta, CGSC Ms. Gayatri Verma, Advocates for UOI. . CORAH HON'BLE THE ACTIMG CHIEF JUSTICE HOM'BLE MR. JUSTICE'RAJIV SAHAI EWDLAW A.&<. SIKRS (Acting Chief Justsce) 1. The controversy involved, in these intra-Court appeals questioning the impugned