Narmal Prasad Mishra and Another v. Mukut Bihari and 5 Others

Order 5 Rule 17-Procedure when defendant refuses to accept service, or cannot be found.— Where the defendant or his agent or such other person as aforesaid refuses to sign the acknowledgment, or where the serving officer, after using all due and reasonable diligence, cannot find the defendant[who is absent from his residence at the time when service is sought to be effected on him at his residence and there is no likelihood of his being found at the residence within a reasonable time] and there is no agent empowered to accept service of the summons on his behalf, nor any other person on whom service can be made, the serving officer shall affix a copy of the summons on the outer door or some other conspicuous part of the house in which the defendant ordinarily resides or carries on business or personally works for gain, and shall then return the original to the Court from which it was issued, with a report endorsed thereon or annexed thereto stating that he has so affixed the copy, the circumstances under which he did so, and the name and address of the person (if any) by whom the house was identified and in whose presence the copy was affixed. ******------*****------****

¶20Substituted service.—(1) Where the Court is satisfied that there is reason to believe that the defendant is keeping out of the way for the purpose of avoiding service, or that for any other reason the summons cannot be served in the ordinary way, the Court shall order the summons to be served by affixing a copy thereof in some conspicuous place in the Court-house, and also upon some conspicuous part of the house (if any) in which the defendant is known to have last resided or carried on business or personally worked for gain, or in such other manner as the Court thinks fit. [(1A) Where the Court acting under sub-rule (1) orders service by an advertisement in a newspaper, the newspaper shall be a daily newspaper circulating in the locality in which the defendant is last known to have actually and voluntarily resided, carried on business or personally worked for gain.]

(2) Effect of substituted service.—Service substituted by order of the Court shall be as effectual as if it had been made on the defendant personally.

(3) Where service substituted, time for appearance to be fixed.—Where service is substituted by order of the Court, the Court shall fix such time for the appearance of the defendant as the case may require." ******------*****------**** Article 123 Limitation Act, 1963

¶123To set aside a decree passed ex parte or to rehear an appeal decreed or heard ex parte. Thirty days The date of the decree or where the summons or notice was not duly served, when the applicant had knowledge of the decree. Explanation.—For the purpose of this article, substituted service under Rule 20 of Order V of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 (5 of 1908) shall not be deemed to be due service.

¶45From the perusal of the aforesaid provisions of law, it would be clear that whenever a suit is filed in a court of law which is governed by the Code   of   Civil   Procedure,   1908,   summons   have   to   be   issued   to   the defendants. The summons are served through the process server and as far as possible the summons are to be served on to parties to the suit, in case if the person upon whom the service is to be affected is not available then there is an option of affixation of the summons as provided under Order 5 Rule 17 C.P.C. Similarly, where the court finds expedient, it can also get the summons served on the defendants through registered post.

¶46In terms of Section 27 of the General Clauses Act, if a registered cover is sent to the person at his correct address and the requisite time having elapsed and the registered cover does not return back to the court or returns to the court with the endorsement such as refusal then in such circumstances, the service shall be deemed to have been affected. In this regard, the decision of the Apex Court in  Ajeet Seeds Limited Vs. K. Gopala Krishnaiah; (2014) 12 SCC 685  is   relevant   and  the  relevant portion of the said report is being reproduced hereinafter:- "9. This Court then explained the nature of presumptions under Section 114 of the Evidence Act and under Section 27 of the GC Act and pointed out how these two presumptions are to be employed while considering the question of service of notice under Section 138 of the NI Act. The relevant paragraphs read as under: (C.C. Alavi Haji case [C.C. Alavi Haji v. Palapetty Muhammed, (2007) 6 SCC 555 : (2007) 3 SCC (Cri) 236] , SCC pp. 563-64, paras 13-14) "13. According to Section 114 of the Act, read with Illustration (f) thereunder, when it appears to the court that the common course of business renders it probable that a thing would happen, the court may draw presumption that the thing would have happened, unless there are circumstances in a particular case to show that the common course of business was not followed. Thus, Section 114 enables the court to presume the existence of any fact which it thinks likely to have happened, regard being had to the common course of natural events, human conduct and public and private business in their relation to the facts of the particular case. Consequently, the court can presume that the common course of business has been followed in particular cases. When applied to communications sent by post, Section 114 enables the court to presume that in the common course of natural events, the communication would have been delivered at the address of the addressee. But the presumption that is raised under Section 27 of the GC Act is a far stronger presumption. Further, while Section 114 of the Evidence Act refers to a general presumption, Section 27 refers to a specific presumption. For the sake of ready reference, Section 27 of the GC Act is extracted below: '27. Meaning of service by post.—Where any Central Act or Regulation made after the commencement of this Act authorises or requires any document to be served by post, whether the expression "serve" or either of the expression "give" or "send" or any other expression is used, then, unless a different intention appears, the service shall be deemed to be effected by properly addressing, pre-paying and posting by registered post, a letter containing the document, and, unless the contrary is proved, to have been effected at the time at which the letter would be delivered in the ordinary course of post.'

¶14Section 27 gives rise to a presumption that service of notice has been effected when it is sent to the correct address by registered post. In view of the said presumption, when stating that a notice has been sent by registered post to the address of the drawer, it is unnecessary to further aver in the complaint that in spite of the return of the notice unserved, it is deemed to have been served or that the addressee is deemed to have knowledge of the notice. Unless and until the contrary is proved by the addressee, service of notice is deemed to have been effected at the time at which the letter would have been delivered in the ordinary course of business. This Court has already held that when a notice is sent by registered post and is returned with a postal endorsement 'refused' or 'not available in the house' or 'house locked' or 'shop closed' or 'addressee not in station', due service has to be presumed. (Vide Jagdish Singh v. Natthu Singh [(1992) 1 SCC 647] , State of M.P. v. Hiralal [(1996) 7 SCC 523] and V. Raja Kumari v. P. Subbarama Naidu [(2004) 8 SCC 774 : 2005 SCC (Cri) 393] .) It is, therefore, manifest that in view of the presumption available under Section 27 of the Act, it is not necessary to aver in the complaint under Section 138 of the Act that service of notice was evaded by the accused or that the accused had a role to play in the return of the notice unserved."

¶10It is thus clear that Section 114 of the Evidence Act enables the Court to presume that in the common course of natural events, the communication would have been delivered at the address of the addressee. Section 27 of the GC Act gives rise to a presumption that service of notice has been effected when it is sent to the correct address by registered post. It is not necessary to aver in the complaint that in spite of the return of the notice unserved, it is deemed to have been served or that the addressee is deemed to have knowledge of the notice. Unless and until the contrary is proved by the addressee, service of notice is deemed to have been effected at the time at which the letter would have been delivered in the ordinary course of business. Similarly, the Apex Court in  Vishwabandhu Vs. Sri Krishna And Another; (2021) SCC 549 in paragraph 15 has observed as under:- "15. The summons issued by registered post were received back with postal endorsement of refusal, as would be clear from the order dated 19-2-1997. Sub-rule (5) of Order 5 Rule 9 of the Code states inter alia that if the defendant or his agent had refused to take delivery of the postal article containing the summons, the court issuing the summons shall declare that the summons had been duly served on the defendant. The order dated 19-2-1997 was thus completely in conformity with the legal requirements. In a slightly different context, while considering the effect of Section 27 of the General Clauses Act, 1897, a Bench of three Judges of this Court in C.C. Alavi Haji v. Palapetty Muhammed [C.C. Alavi Haji v. Palapetty Muhammed,

(2007) 6 SCC 555 : (2007) 3 SCC (Cri) 236] made the following observations : (SCC p. 564, para 14) "14. Section 27 gives rise to a presumption that service of notice has been effected when it is sent to the correct address by registered post. In view of the said presumption, when stating that a notice has been sent by registered post to the address of the drawer, it is unnecessary to further aver in the complaint that in spite of the return of the notice unserved, it is deemed to have been served or that the addressee is deemed to have knowledge of the notice. Unless and until the contrary is proved by the addressee, service of notice is deemed to have been effected at the time at which the letter would have been delivered in the ordinary course of business. This Court has already held that when a notice is sent by registered post and is returned with a postal endorsement "refused" or "not available in the house" or "house locked" or "shop closed" or "addressee not in station", due service has to be presumed. (Vide Jagdish Singh v. Natthu Singh [Jagdish Singh v. Natthu Singh, (1992) 1 SCC 647] ; State of M.P. v. Hiralal [State of M.P. v. Hiralal, (1996) 7 SCC 523] and V. Raja Kumari v. P. Subbarama Naidu [V. Raja Kumari v. P. Subbarama Naidu, (2004) 8 SCC 774 : 2005 SCC (Cri) 393] .)"

¶47There may be cases where for certain reasons, the defendant cannot be served and in such circumstances the court may take recourse to get the defendants served by substituted service i.e. through publication for which the court has to take recourse to Order 5 Rule 20 C.P.C.

¶48In order to permit the service through substituted mode, the court is required to form a subjective satisfaction and it has reason to believe that the defendant is keeping out of the way for the purpose of avoiding service or that the summons cannot be served in the ordinary course then the court can order the summons to be affixed in some conspicuous place in the court house or upon some conspicuous place where the defendant is known to have last resided or carried on business or personally worked for gains.

¶49Rule 1-A was inserted in Order 5 Rule -20 C.P.C. by the amending Act which came into effect from 01.02.1977 which permitted the courts to get   the   summoned   served   through   an   advertisement   in   a   newspaper provided  the  newspaper  must  be  a  daily  newspaper   circulating  in  the locality   in   which   the   defendant   is   last   known   to   have   actually   and voluntarily resided or carried on business or personally worked for gains.

¶50It is in the aforesaid circumstance that a publication can be made and Sub Rule 2 of Order 5 Rule 20 C.P.C. saves such service and it would be treated as effectual as if the defendant was personally served.

¶51At this stage, it will be relevant to notice the observations of the Apex Court in  Sunil Poddar Vs. Union Bank of India; (2008) 2 SCC 326 wherein it has been held that once a summon is published in the newspaper having   wide   circulation   in   the   locality,   it   is   immaterial   whether   the defendants were subscriber to the said newspapers or whether they read it. The relevant paragraphs of the said report read as under:- "23. It is, therefore, clear that the legal position under the amended Code is not whether the defendant was actually served with the summons in accordance with the procedure laid down and in the manner prescribed in Order 5 of the Code, but whether (i) he had notice of the date of hearing of the suit; and (ii) whether he had sufficient time to appear and answer the claim of the plaintiff. Once these two conditions are satisfied, an ex parte decree cannot be set aside even if it is established that there was irregularity in service of summons. If the court is convinced that the defendant had otherwise knowledge of the proceedings and he could have appeared and answered the plaintiff's claim, he cannot put forward a ground of non-service of summons for setting aside ex parte decree passed against him by invoking Rule 13 of Order 9 of the Code. Since the said provision applies to the Debts Recovery Tribunals and the Appellate Tribunals under the Act in view of Section 22(2)(g) of the Act, both the Tribunals were right in observing that the ground raised by the appellants could not be upheld. It is not even contended by the appellants that though they had knowledge of the proceedings before DRT, they had no sufficient time to appear and answer the claim of the plaintiff Bank and on that ground, ex parte order deserves to be set aside."

¶52Proceeding further, if Article 123 of the Schedule appended with the Limitation Act is seen, it clearly provides that the limitation for moving an application under Order 9 Rule 13 C.P.C. is 30 days, however, it further states that this period of 30 days is to be reckoned from the date of the decree in case if the summons are duly served. In case if the summons are not duly served then the period of 30 days is reckoned from the date of knowledge of the decree. The said Article also contains an explanation that the service made by publication shall not be deemed to be due service.

¶53In the aforesaid backdrop, if the submissions of learned counsel for the petitioners is examined, it would be clear that the explanation which has been appended in Article 123 is only applicable to the said provision alone.

¶54It is not quite correct to state that Sub Rule 2 of Order 5 Rule 20 C.P.C. was incorporated by the amendment in 1977. Rather, the correct position is that by the amending Act of 1977 Rule-1 was inserted, it only permitted the court to get the summons served through advertisement in a newspaper and in order to do it, the requirement is that the newspaper must be   a   daily   newspaper   having   wide   circulation   in   the   area   where   the defendant sought to be served through publication was last known to have resided or worked for gains.  In this regard, the observations of the Apex Court in Basant Singh and Another Vs. Roman Roman Catholic Mission;

(2002) 7 SCC 531 and the relevant paras thereof read as under:- "6. Regarding the contention of the counsel for the appellants that the summons were not duly served, as the substituted service has been published in the local daily Aacharan instead of Dainik Bhaskar, we may point out that it is in the evidence on record that both Aacharan and Dainik Bhaskar are local dailies and are widely circulated in the area. In ordinary circumstances, if both the local dailies are widely circulated in the area the change of the name of the local daily from Dainik Bhaskar to Aacharan would not materially affect the service of notice by way of substituted service, deemed to have been served, and would not invalidate the effect of substituted service just because the notice for substituted service has been published in the local daily which is not ordered by the court. It is the specific contention of the plaintiff-respondent that the notice has been published in the local daily Aacharan on 9-8-1986 and the said local daily is widely circulated in the area and the substituted service would construe as sufficient notice upon the defendants. We are also of the view that it is inherently probable that publication in the local daily Aacharan which is widely circulated in the area would have constituted a sufficient notice to the defendants.

¶7Before the trial court the stand taken by the plaintiff was that the defendants had knowledge about the suit filed by the plaintiff and they had sufficient time to appear and answer the plaintiff's claim but they did not appear and the application had been filed with the intention to cause delay. Be that as it may, we are of the view that the publication of the substituted service in the local daily Aacharan instead of Dainik Bhaskar is a mere irregularity in service of summons.

¶8Second proviso to Order 9 Rule 13 casts an embargo on the court that a decree passed ex parte shall not be set aside merely on the ground that there has been an irregularity in the service of summons."

¶9Order 5, proviso to sub-rule (2) of Rule 19-A CPC provides that where the summons are properly addressed, prepaid and duly sent by registered post with acknowledgement due, notwithstanding the fact that the acknowledgement having been lost or mislaid, or for any other reason, has not been received by the court within thirty days from the date of the issue of the summons, the court shall presume that notice is duly served. Further, Section 27 of the General Clauses Act, 1897 (in short "the Act") provides similar provision. The presumptions are rebuttable. It is always open to the defendants to rebut the presumption by leading convincing and cogent evidence."

¶55The impact of the substituted service through publication was noticed by the Apex Court in a subsequent decision in  Parimal vs. Veena Alias Bharti; (2011) 3 SCC 545  and the relevant paragraphs thereof read as under:- "12. It is evident from the above that an ex parte decree against a defendant has to be set aside if the party satisfies the court that summons had not been duly served or he was prevented by sufficient cause from appearing when the suit was called on for hearing. However, the court shall not set aside the said decree on mere irregularity in the service of summons or in a case where the defendant had notice of the date and sufficient time to appear in the court. The legislature in its wisdom, made the second proviso mandatory in nature. Thus, it is not permissible for the court to allow the application in utter disregard of the terms and conditions incorporated in the second proviso herein.

¶13"Sufficient cause" is an expression which has been used in a large number of statutes. The meaning of the word "sufficient" is "adequate" or "enough", inasmuch as may be necessary to answer the purpose intended. Therefore, word "sufficient" embraces no more than that which provides a platitude which when the act done suffices to accomplish the purpose intended in the facts and circumstances existing in a case and duly examined from the viewpoint of a reasonable standard of a cautious man. In this context, "sufficient cause" means that the party had not acted in a negligent manner or there was a want of bona fide on its part in view of the facts and circumstances of a case or the party cannot be alleged to have been "not acting diligently" or "remaining inactive". However, the facts and circumstances of each case must afford sufficient ground to enable the court concerned to exercise discretion for the reason that whenever the court exercises discretion, it has to be exercised judiciously. (Vide Ramlal v. Rewa Coalfields Ltd. [AIR 1962 SC 361] , Lonand Grampanchayat v. Ramgiri Gosavi [AIR 1968 SC 222] , Surinder Singh Sibia v. Vijay Kumar Sood [(1992) 1 SCC 70 : AIR 1992 SC 1540] and Oriental Aroma Chemical Industries Ltd. v. Gujarat Industrial Development Corpn. [(2010) 5 SCC 459 : (2010) 2 SCC (L&S) 50 : (2010) 2 SCC (Cri) 1291 : (2010) 2 SCC (Civ) 448] ) --------******--------****----***** ...15. While deciding whether there is sufficient cause or not, the court must bear in mind the object of doing substantial justice to all the parties concerned and that the technicalities of the law should not prevent the court from doing substantial justice and doing away the illegality perpetuated on the basis of the judgment impugned before it. (Vide State of Bihar v. Kameshwar Prasad Singh [(2000) 9 SCC 94 : 2000 SCC (L&S) 845 : AIR 2000 SC 2306] , Madanlal v. Shyamlal [(2002) 1 SCC 535 : AIR 2002 SC 100] , Davinder Pal Sehgal v. Partap Steel Rolling Mills (P) Ltd. [(2002) 3 SCC 156 : AIR 2002 SC 451] , Ram Nath Sao v. Gobardhan Sao [(2002) 3 SCC 195 : AIR 2002 SC 1201] , Kaushalya Devi v. Prem Chand [(2005) 10 SCC 127] , Srei International Finance Ltd. v. Fairgrowth Financial Services Ltd. [(2005) 13 SCC 95] and Reena Sadh v. Anjana Enterprises [(2008) 12 SCC 589 : AIR 2008 SC 2054] .)

¶16In order to determine the application under Order 9 Rule 13 CPC, the test that has to be applied is whether the defendant honestly and sincerely intended to remain present when the suit was called on for hearing and did his best to do so. Sufficient cause is thus the cause for which the defendant could not be blamed for his absence. Therefore, the applicant must approach the court with a reasonable defence. Sufficient cause is a question of fact and the court has to exercise its discretion in the varied and special circumstances in the case at hand. There cannot be a straitjacket formula of universal application. Presumption of service by registered post and burden of proof

¶17This Court after considering a large number of its earlier judgments in Greater Mohali Area Development Authority v. Manju Jain [(2010) 9 SCC 157 : (2010) 3 SCC (Civ) 639 : AIR 2010 SC 3817] held that in view of the provisions of Section 114 Illustration (f) of the Evidence Act, 1872 and Section 27 of the General Clauses Act, 1897 there is a presumption that the addressee has received the letter sent by registered post. However, the presumption is rebuttable on a consideration of evidence of impeccable character. A similar view has been reiterated by this Court in Sunil Kumar Sambhudayal Gupta (Dr.) v. State of Maharashtra [(2010) 13 SCC 657 : JT

(2010) 12 SC 287] .

¶18In Gujarat Electricity Board v. Atmaram Sungomal Poshani [(1989) 2 SCC 602 : 1989 SCC (L&S) 393 : (1989) 10 ATC 396 : AIR 1989 SC 1433] this Court held as under : (SCC pp. 611-12, para 8) "8. There is presumption of service of a letter sent under registered cover, if the same is returned back with a postal endorsement that the addressee refused to accept the same. No doubt the presumption is rebuttable and it is open to the party concerned to place evidence before the court to rebut the presumption by showing that the address mentioned on the cover was incorrect or that the postal authorities never tendered the registered letter to him or that there was no occasion for him to refuse the same. The burden to rebut the presumption lies on the party, challenging the factum of service." (emphasis added)

¶19The provisions of Section 101 of the Evidence Act provide that the burden of proof of the facts rests on the party who substantially asserts it and not on the party who denies it. In fact, burden of proof means that a party has to prove an allegation before he is entitled to a judgment in his favour. Section 103 provides that the burden of proof as to any particular fact lies on that person who wishes the court to believe in its existence, unless it is provided by any special law that the proof of that fact shall lie on any particular person. The provision of Section 103 amplifies the general rule of Section 101 that the burden of proof lies on the person who asserts the affirmative of the facts in issue."

¶56Having noticed the relevant provisions and the pronouncement of the Apex Court, it would be clear as to how the service through publication is to be made and how it impacts the service on the parties.

¶57At this stage, it will also be relevant to notice that apparently, there is no inconsistency between Order 5 Rule 20 (2) C.P.C. and the explanation appended to Article 123 in the schedule appended to the Limitation Act, 1963.   Both   the   provisions   operate   in   different   spheres.  As   far   as   the provisions of Order 5 Rule 20 C.P.C. is concerned, it permits the court to take   recourse   through   substituted   service   (through   publication)   in   a newspaper and sub rule 2 states that the service through publication will be as effectual as due service made on the defendant personally and the purpose and intent of Sub rule -2 is to enable the court dealing with the matter to proceed further. Meaning thereby that upon filing of a suit before a court of law, the court is required to issue notice to the defendants. Before proceeding,   the  court  has  to   record   its  subjective   satisfaction   that the defendants of the suit are properly served and once it arrives at the said satisfaction and yet the defendants do not appear in the suit then it would enable the court to proceed further and pass appropriate orders including setting the defendants ex-parte so that the matter can be tried and decided. If this provision is not invoked then perhaps in certain cases where the defendant is not served and even after publication where the service is not treated effectual service then the suit will not proceed and it cannot be left in limbo indefinitely. In order to avoid this uncertainty sub rule (2) of Order V Rule 20 is to be interpreted and it is in this context it is held that the provisions of Order V Rule 20 (2) is for the Court to enable it to prove further.

¶58On the other hand, the explanation in Article 123 of the Limitation Act, 1963 is for the purpose of that article alone. Where the defendant moves an application under 9 Rule 13 C.P.C. for setting aside the ex-parte judgment and in such a case, the limitation as provided in the said Article 123 can be seen which is in two parts; (I) there can be a situation where the defendant may have put in appearance in the suit and later for some reason may not participate and the decree is passed ex-parte, in such situation, the limitation would be reckoned from the date of the decree. (II) There may be a situation that the defendants for some reason could never be served either personally or through affixation or through substituted service and later if an application for setting aside the ex-parte decree is moved then it can be filed within 30 days from the date of knowledge.

¶59It is for only such defendants against whom the suit has proceeded ex-parte and the service was through publication that the limitation would be   from   30   days   of   the   knowledge   and   to   protect   such   litigants   the explanation has been appended, however, it is not correct to say that the explanation would run counter to Order 5 Rule 20 (2) C.P.C. Primarily, Order 5 rule 20 (2) C.P.C. is for the benefit of the court to enable it to proceed further whereas the explanation appended in Article 123 is for the benefit of such defendants against whom an ex-parte decree has been passed and what will be the period of limitation to move an application under Order 9 Rule 13 C.P.C. has been mentioned and what will be the starting point of limitation has been explained. Thus, it cannot be said there is any contradiction or inconsistency in the provisions of Order 5 Rule 20

(2) C.P.C. and Article 123 of the Limitation Act, 1963.as projected by the learned counsel for the petitioners.

¶60It   is   now   well   settled   that   the   courts   endevour   to   construe   the provisions of law harmoniously so that each provision is given its complete extant within which they operate and any inconsistency may be avoided. In case if the argument of the learned counsel for the petitioner is accepted, it may give rise to anomalous situation and the endevour of the court is always to avoid inconsistency and to harmonies the provisions, hence, the contention   of   the   learned   counsel   for   the  petitioners   is  fallacious and misconceived.

¶61The court is fortified in its view and draws strength from a Full Bench decision of this Court in Ram Bharose v. Ganga Singh 1931 SCC Online All. 133 and the relevant portion reads as under:- "I am unable to accept this argument. The object of issuing a summons is to inform the party, against whom a suit has been instituted, of the fact that there is a suit against him, and if he so chooses, he may come and defend it. If that be the object of a summons, and if, for no fault of his own, a defendant was never put in a position to know that a suit had been instituted against him, whatever steps may have been taken for serving the summons on him, these steps can never be accepted as amounting to "due service". When an order for substituted service is made by a court, on the representation of a plaintiff, only one side is present before the court and it acts on the representation of one party. Obviously it should be open to the defendant when he appears, to show that the method employed was not calculated to effect the purpose which the court had in view, namely, informing the defendant of the institution of the suit. If this is so, the court has to consider, in view of all the circumstances of the case, for example, the place where the defendant was when the summons was issued to him, where and how the summons was served, and so on, in order to see whether there was due service. For example, if a man has gone to Burma to earn a living and he has relations at home with whom he is in constant touch, and the summons is served on the defendant by affixation of a copy of it on the outer door of his house, it may be open to the court to infer that the service was good, it being expected that the defendant's close relations, living jointly with him in the same house, would inform him of the case. Again, where it is found that the defendant knew that a suit was likely to come and, in order that a summons may not be served on him, he leaves the place, it may be open to the court to hold that there was due service by substitution. On the other hand, if the defendant went, say, to Burma to earn a living and left no one at home, which remained vacant, and at the instance of the plaintiff a substituted service was ordered by publication of the fact of the institution of the suit in a paper published, say, at Aligarh, where the suit was instituted, the court would be in a position to hold that there was no due service. The rule that substituted service is to be taken as effectual as personal service only means that the court hearing the case may proceed with the suit as if the summons had been personally served on the defendant. The result is that, in my opinion, whether there has been 'due service' or not is to be considered by the court to which an application has been made for setting aside an ex parte decree, having regard to all the circumstances of the case as described above. If the conclusion is that there was due service, then, if the application has not come within thirty days of the decree, he is barred by time. If the conclusion is that there was no due service, the limitation would be computed from the date of the applicant's knowledge of the decree. The mere fact that a substituted service had been ordered is immaterial, by itself."

¶62Applying the principles as noticed hereinabove to the facts of the instant case, it would be seen that Smt. Asha could not be served through registered cover as the registered cover had returned with an endorsement that she was not residing at the given address but was in Surkhet, Nepal. Even though, the Trial Court went ahead in getting the summons served through publication but it could not be disputed that Jan Morcha, the daily newspaper wherein the summons were published had any circulation in Surkhet, Nepal.

¶63Even though, it has been urged that the said newspaper   was even circulated in Nepalganj but there is nothing to state that the said newspaper had circulation in Surkhet, Nepal. Needless to say that Surkhet is a different district whereas Nepalganj is in a different district in a foreign country i.e. Nepal. The Trial Court as well as the Revisional Court has taken note of the aforesaid and has recorded findings regarding the fact that the defendant Smt. Asha Devi was not personally served nor the registered cover was served, hence, treating the publication as not due service for the purposes of computing the limitation for moving the application under Order 9 Rule 13 C.P.C, it held that the applications were within 30 days for the date of knowledge, hence, within time and thereafter the Trial Court went on to consider the application under Order 9 Rule 13 C.P.C. and found that there was sufficient cause for the defendants, by which they were prevented to contest the proceedings and since the decree was joint and several and indivisible, hence, if it is was set aside for one defendant, it would have to be set aside for all. There is no error in the findings recorded by the Trial Court and the Revisional Court.

¶64Moreover, there is another flaw in the arguments of the learned counsel and that is the application under Section 5 of the Limitation Act, 1963 was rejected by the Trial Court by holding that the application under Order 9 Rule 13 C.P.C. were within 30 days of the knowledge of the decree, hence within time, this order was known to the plaintiffs but they never assailed the same before the Revisional Court nor before this Court.

¶65Merely to state that since in the order itself it was written that the application   under   Section   5   of   the   Limitation   Act   is   rejected   and consequently the application under Order 9 rule 13 C.P.C. would have to be rejected, is apparently an erroneous submission, in the facts of the instant case. May be the language used by the Trial Court while disposing of the application under Section 5 of the Limitation Act, 1963 may not have been very happily worded but the fact remains that in the entire text of the said order dated 26.10.2023, it has been clearly explained by the Trial Court that the application under Order 9 Rule 13 C.P.C. is to be treated within time and for the said reason, the application under Section 5 of the Limitation Act, 1963 was rejected, however, it did not mean nor it is evident from the perusal of the order dated 26.10.2023 that the application under Section 5 of the Limitation Act, 1963 was rejected on merit i.e. to say that the defendants were unable to explain the delay or they could not establish the sufficient cause as required, hence, the submission to the contrary made by learned counsel for the petitioners does not impress this Court.

¶66For all the aforesaid reasons, this Court is satisfied that there is no error in the orders impugned which may persuade this Court to entertain the aforesaid petitions which are devoid of merits and all the petitions deserve to be dismissed.

¶67Since the matter of R.S. No. 1146 of 2018 is to be contested on merits, accordingly, this Court provides that the Trial Court seized with the Regular Suit No. 1146 of 2018 shall after affording full opportunity of hearing to the parties but without granting any unnecessary adjournments shall expedite the proceedings to decide the suit on its own merits as expeditiously as possible.

¶68The writ petitions bearing W.P. No. 96 (A-227) of 2024, W.P. No. 91 (A-227) of 2024, W.P. No. 342 (A-227) of 2024 and W.P. No. 347 (A-227) of 2024 are dismissed.  Costs are made easy. Order Date :- 15th March, 2024 Asheesh (Jaspreet Singh, J.) High Court of Judicature at Allahabad, Lucknow Bench

AFR Reserved Court No. 8 Case :- MATTERS UNDER ARTICLE 227 No. - 96 of 2024 Petitioner :- Narmal Prasad Mishra And Another Respondent :- Mukut Bihari And 5 Others Counsel for Petitioner :- Rajeiu Kumar Tripathi Counsel for Respondent :- Sushil Kumar Pathak,Pawan Kumar Mishra,Piyush Asthana Along with Case :- MATTERS UNDER ARTICLE 227 No. - 91 of 2024 Petitioner :- Narmal Prasad Mishra And Another Respondent :- Mukut Bihari And 5 Others Counsel for Petitioner :- Rajeiu Kumar Tripathi Counsel for Respondent :- Sushil Kumar Pathak,Pawan Kumar Mishra,Piyush Asthana Along with Case :- MATTERS UNDER ARTICLE 227 No. - 342 of 2024 Petitioner :- Narmal Prasad Mishra And Another Respondent :- Mukul Bihari And 5 Others Counsel for Petitioner :- Rajeiu Kumar Tripathi Counsel for Respondent :- Sushil Kumar Pathak,Pawan Kumar Mishra,Piyush Asthana Along with Case :- MATTERS UNDER ARTICLE 227 No. - 347 of 2024 Petitioner :- Narmal Prasad Mishra And Another Respondent :- Mukut Bihari And 5 Others Counsel for Petitioner :- Rajeiu Kumar Tripathi Counsel for Respondent :- Sushil Kumar Pathak,Pawan Kumar Mishra,Piyush As,Piyush Asthana Hon'ble Jaspreet Singh,J. 1. This is a batch of four petitions preferred under Article 227 of the Constitution of India assailing the order dated 20.12.2023 passed by the District Judge, Bahraich and order dated 07.11.2023 passed by the Additional Civil Judge (Junior Division)/F.T.C. Bahraich whereby the application preferred by the private respondents under Order 9 Rule 13 C.P.C. has been allowed and also holding that the said application was within time and was not barred by limitation. 2. Since the issue involved in all the four petitions are common and the matter is in between the same parties, consequently, all the four petitions are being decided by this common judgment. 3. The Court has heard Sri Rajeiu Kumar Tripathi, learned counsel appearing for the petitioner. Sri S.C. Sitapuri, learned counsel who has filed his vakalatnama on behalf of the private respondent nos. 2 and 4 in the petition bearing No. 96 (A-227) of 2024 which is taken on record. Sri Piyush Asthana, learned counsel appearing for respondent no. 1 and 3, Sri Pawan Kumar Mishra, learned counsel for the respondent nos. 5 and 6. 4. The learned counsel for the private respondents submitted that they do not wish to file any counter affidavit as only a question of law is involved, hence, with the consent of learned counsel for the parties, the Court has heard the matter and it is being decided at the admission stage itself. 5. For the sake of convenience, the Court has lifted the facts from the Petition No. 96 (A-227) of 2024 and shall refer to the parties as impleaded in the instant petitions. 6. In order to appreciate the controversy involved in the instant four petitions, it will be appropriate to delineate the facts giving rise to the instant petitions. 7. That the petitioners before this Court, were the plaintiffs in Regular Suit No. 1146 of 2018 while the private respondents were the defendants. The petitioners filed a suit as aforesaid, seeking a decree of cancellation of sale deed dated 16.09.1982 and injunction. The sale deed was executed by Ram Pyare in favour of the private respondents and it was impugned on the ground that Ram Pyare was the grand-father (maternal) of the petitioners who bequeathed the property to the petitioners by means of his will dated 10.09.1982. 8. It is only at a later stage that when the defendants of the suit attempted to get their names mutated in the revenue records on the basis of the alleged sale deed dated 06.09.1982 that the petitioners became aware of the sale deed and thus filed the said suit. The suit proceeded ex-parte against the defendants and it was finally decided ex-parte on 13.09.1982. 9. The ex-parte judgment an decree dated 13.09.1982 was assailed by the defendants of the suit by filing application under Order 9 Rule 13 C.P.C.in two sets; (i) one set of the defendants namely Mukut Bihar, Arvind